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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial stability and sustainability are always the prime concerns of most 
jurisdictions and countries around the world.  The Hong Kong government has also 
been striving its best to maintain the status of Hong Kong as a leading financial 
centre in the region as well as pursue sound financial development as a whole.  
Nevertheless, the recent global financial crisis hit on the regulatory problems severely 
and revealed many regulatory issues on market conduct, consumer protection, 
unethical selling of financial products, and even mal-administration on certain 
financial industries which have drawn huge public concern.  While the Hong Kong 
government has long been adopting the governing philosophy of financial 
conservatism and positive non-interventionism historically, yet there is overwhelming 
public urge to strengthen accountability and stringent control subsequent to the recent 
financial turmoil.  
  
In the regulation of the financial sector, a wide array of policy tools is adopted.  To 
assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of these policy tools by various 
parameters, it is surprising to see that all the financial industries in Hong Kong are 
regulated by independent statutory bodies except insurance industry, given its breadth 
and depth.  With different institutional design and regulatory power, the insurance 
regulation over the market participants, including insurers and insurance 
intermediaries, are not on par with banking, securities and pension industries.  As a 
result of different regulatory regimes and structures, regulated entities are prone to 
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take advantage on regulatory arbitrage which poses danger to the overall stability of 
the financial sector.  In a macro view, it seems that the regulation of insurance 
industry is the weakest link amid the overall financial regulatory efforts rendered.  
  
This project taps on the concept of three streams model by Kingdon (1995) which 
sets the scene for examining the current financial sector regulation, especially the 
insurance industry.  By checking against the assessing criteria, namely legitimacy, 
effectiveness, accountability, due process, expertise, efficiency and autonomy, four 
core problems are identified in the insurance sector –– insufficient power to regulate 
insurers, self-regulatory problems, outdated institutional design and difficult cross-
boundary regulation over complicated products.   
 
In resolving the regulatory problems in insurance industry, the project examines 
whether the improvement on certain policy tools could provide a quick solution in 
enhancing insurance regulation in Hong Kong.  Theoretically speaking, the regulation 
on insurance industry could be strengthened to a certain extent through altering policy 
tools.  But if at the very beginning, the design of the regulatory form does not tailor 
with its desired function, it should then be an opportune time to re-think whether a 
change in regulatory form is more desirable in order to better cope with the regulatory 
loopholes in the insurance industry and catch up with international standards in 
maintaining Hong Kong’s international status as a financial hub.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Focus and Objectives of the Project 
 
This project addresses the financial sector regulation in Hong Kong, in particular the 
insurance regulatory system.  Its objectives are to study the current regulatory system 
and examine shortcomings of the system in face of the dynamic financial market.  By 
overseeing regulatory tools available for the government and exploring possible 
financial regulatory models over other international financial centres, some 
recommendations are proposed to fit the local financial environment most.  
 
Why the Insurance Industry was Chosen for Study 
 
Hong Kong remains one of the leading financial markets in the world after its 
handover to China in 1997 1 .  As an international financial centre, Hong Kong 
performs its leading role in attracting foreign investors for investments and business 
operations in the past decades.  To further promote the financial market development 
and maintain its leading status among international financial centres, an up-to-date, 
secure and comprehensive regulatory system is crucial to create a level-playing field 
for all participants, including financial institutions and customers in financial markets.   
                                                          
1
  According to the Financial Development Index 2012, Hong Kong is ranked the first of the world’s 
leading financial systems and capital markets, followed by the United States and United Kingdom 
(World Economic Forum, 2012, p. xiii, Table 1).  Hong Kong is also ranked the third international 
financial centre, following London and New York (Long Finance, 2012, p. 4, Table 1). 
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Within the four industries in the financial market regulation, namely banking, 
securities, insurance and pension, the insurance industry was chosen to be the focus 
in this project because of the significance of insurance and its wide coverage over the 
public.  Unlike deposit or investment products which are optional to the public, 
insurance is necessary for protection against different kinds of risks, like death, 
disability and medical expenses.   
 
Much attention is put on the insurance industry not only because it is heavily engaged 
in the provision of insurance products with substantial saving and investment 
elements, but also the unique position of the regulator of local insurance industry –– 
the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI).  While other local financial 
regulators take the form of independent statutory bodies, only OCI remains as a 
government department overseeing the insurance regulation.  Its full dependence on 
government resources and existing regulatory system are less desirable that the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested more than a decade ago that there 
should be greater clarity in OCI’s role and its operational independence status so as to 
enhance the effectiveness of insurance supervision in Hong Kong2.  Due to other 
                                                          
2
 Established in 1999, the IMF is an organization of 188 countries (in July 2013), “working to foster 
global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high 
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world”.  Its 
Financial Sector Assessment Programme is a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of a country’s 
financial sector.  Its first report on Hong Kong was published in June 2003, which commented that 
the insurance supervisory function in Hong Kong could not be considered truly independent as 
long as OCI was part of the government.  The institutional and governance framework of OCI 
would need to be more clearly defined, and to be made more transparent and accountable amid the 
IMF’s forthcoming assessment on Hong Kong again in 2013.  (IMF, 2003, 2013a & 2013b) 
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considerations, however, the Hong Kong government’s only action was to consult the 
public on the establishment of an independent insurance regulator until mid-2010, in 
which divided voices and comments were received.   
  
The existing insurance regulatory system is outdated and far lagged behind the pace 
of market development and public expectation.  There has been increasing concern 
over the integrity, accountability and control of the giant financial institutions and the 
protection for consumers, especially on insurance products regulation where 
complicated financial products were commonly packaged as insurance products sold 
to individual investors.  The Lehman Brothers mini-bond incident triggered the 
opening of a policy window as “an opportunity for advocates to push their pet 
solutions or to push attention to their special problems” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 203).   It 
is deemed as an opportune time for a review on the current insurance regulatory 
system.  
 
Regulatory Problems Revealed by Global Financial Crisis  
 
With the rapid development of financial products and the ever-changing market 
environment, the existing insurance regulatory regime formulated more than three 
decades ago is far lagged behind the pace of market development and public 
expectation3 .  The global financial crisis in 2008 triggered by the US subprime 
mortgage crisis and the US government bailout of AIG revealed the failures of 
                                                          
3
  Currently, the regulation of insurance industry is mainly derived from the Insurance Companies 
Ordinance (Cap. 41), which was enacted in 1983.   
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corporate governance and risk management in financial institutions, and loopholes in 
the financial regulatory system, including the one in Hong Kong.  It urged the need of 
managing the market conduct and ethics in the selling process and calling for more 
stringent regulation on the financial sector.   
 
The mini-bonds relating to Lehman Brothers in Hong Kong were packaged as a safe 
investment product similar to the bonds issued by Hong Kong blue-chip companies.  
In fact, they were complex financial derivatives, including a mix of collateralized 
debt obligations and credit or equity-linked notes, which were later identified as 
‘poisonous products’ at an indeterminable value.  The packaging as a safe investment 
attracted many retirees and housewives to invest their life savings into the mini-bonds.  
The investors were not informed of the complicated nature of mini-bonds until their 
savings were fully vaporized at the collapse of Lehman Brothers.   
  
The investigations into some 21,000 complaints against the mis-selling of mini-bonds 
caused hundreds of millions of losses to the investors also accentuated the problem of 
overlapping responsibilities between the financial regulators.  The vague 
responsibilities of financial regulators and under-regulation over the financial markets 
reflected the inadequacies in the financial regulatory system to prevent crisis4.  
 
                                                          
4
  After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) conducted their own investigations on the related mini-
bonds and later jointly followed the issue with 16 distributing banks which subsequently agreed to 
offer a number of repurchase schemes to eligible investors in certain mini-bond products (HKMA, 
2013a; SFC, 2013a). 
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Research Questions and Propositions: Theory and Practice 
 
In view of the regulatory problems in the local financial market, this project examines 
different tools for regulation and explores better ways for regulation by using tools 
approach.  The research questions are as follows:  
 
 What types of regulatory tools can a government adopt to oversee and control 
the financial sector, including the insurance industry?   
 
 What particular regulatory tools has the Hong Kong government actually 
adopted to oversee and control the insurance industry? 
 
 According to what criteria can the appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
possible array of regulatory tools be evaluated? 
 
 What other regulatory tools could be adopted by the Hong Kong government to 
more effectively oversee and control the insurance industry? 
 
In this project, it is observed that there is a wide array of tools available for the 
government and each of them has its own strengths and weaknesses.  It should be 
reckoned, however, that there is no single perfect tool which can solve a social 
problem.  Instead, different mix of appropriate tools should be applied under different 
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circumstances to fit for purpose.  Notwithstanding the availability of a wide range of 
tools, a government is usually limited by its governing principles and tends to be 
conservative and risk-adverse in adopting new tools.  The Hong Kong government is 
no exception.  It appears to be cautious in carrying out any major changes or revising 
the existing regulatory system in face of any crisis or critical issues, with the current 
impeding political atmosphere.  Given a more rapidly changing financial environment 
and international regulatory standard, it is time to look beyond the regulation, be 
innovative and adaptive to new tools, so as to keep abreast of the regulatory trend and 
maintain Hong Kong’s competitiveness as an international financial centre.   
 
Overview of Analytical Framework 
 
Fundamental elements of financial sector regulation are related to why, how and how 
effective in terms of regulation and regulatory tools of regulators, which are reflected 
as reasons for regulation, how to regulate the financial institutions and their activities, 
and use and applicability of the regulatory tools.  The three elements are found to 
align with the three streams, viz. problems stream, policy stream and political stream, 
by Kingdon (1995) which are used to analyze the policy process of government 
policy.   
 
Under the Kingdon’s (1995) three streams model, a focusing event pushes the 
government to pay attention to the problem and renders the coupling of three streams, 
which leads to the opening of a policy window and a golden opportunity for agenda 
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setting.  Similarly, when there is any focusing event happening in a market (usually a 
big failure in regulatory regime), the advocates will make use of this good 
opportunity to urge the government to review or renew the regulatory regime.  The 
three streams model is therefore used for setting the conceptualized background of 
the analytical framework of this project for examining the current financial sector 
regulation, especially on the insurance industry.   
 
With reference to the regulatory issues listed out by Freiberg (2010), a set of 
parameters are found in each of the three streams for examination and analysis.  In 
the problems stream, there are four core and generic reasons for the need of 
regulation by government: market failure, public interest, risk management, and trust.  
 
The policy stream describes how the government regulates the market through 
regulatory tools.  Given a wide array of regulatory tools covering various areas, there 
are many classifications on types of tools according to different scholars.  Having 
considered Freiberg’s (2010) classification and financial activities being covered by 
this project, five board forms of regulatory tools are identified: command and control 
tools, economic tools, information tools, structural tools, and informational tools. 
 
Of significance to the political stream, in evaluating how effective the regulatory 
tools are, reference are drawn to the generic situation of the financial sector and the 
criteria for assessing the use and applicability suggested by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 
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(2012).  The seven criteria are legitimacy, effectiveness, accountability, due process, 
expertise, efficiency, and autonomy.  
 
The analytical framework provides a lens through which the financial sector 
regulation can be examined, especially the insurance industry.  Based on the analysis 
and evaluation of the current regulatory regime, together with the overseas regulatory 
models and the global regulatory trend, some recommendations are proposed for the 
insurance regulatory regime in Hong Kong.   
 
Research Methodology 
 
There were many discussions between legislators and local communities on the 
review of financial market regulation in Hong Kong in the past years, as triggered by 
the Lehman Brothers mini-bond incident and global financial crisis.  To conduct the 
research on regulation of local financial market, references were drawn to the 
discussion papers from the Legislative Council (LegCo), consultation documents and 
consultation conclusions of financial industries.  Some time was spent on reading 
articles from newspapers, magazines and journals to grasp the latest development of 
the review of financial sector regulation and gather different views and comments 
from stakeholders, scholars and financial experts, including insurers, industry 
associations, insurance intermediaries, industry bodies, as well as the Consumer 
Council, political parties and professional bodies.  To take a holistic view over 
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financial sector regulation, researches were conducted by going through the websites 
and articles published by local and overseas regulators and governments. 
 
Though discussions of the financial regulatory system and relevant decision making 
are confidential within the government and regulators, the above channels can 
provide the most updated and comprehensive information with views from different 
stakeholders and their considerations.  With the impact of globalization nowadays, it 
is important that the research also covers overseas regulators with a wider perspective 
of the regulatory regime, in providing valuable and updated knowledge on examining 
how a regulatory framework could be evolved in both catching up with the 
international trend and fitting local situations more appropriately.   
 
Chapters Outline 
 
The project contains six chapters, including this Introduction.  The Introduction gives 
an overview of the research project.  It includes the background of the study and 
provides reasons for the research topic so chosen.  Moreover, it highlights the 
research questions and propositions and gives an overview of the analytical 
framework.  It also describes the research methodology and the arrangements of the 
paper.   
 
Chapter 2 includes a literature review of regulatory tools of government and an 
analytical framework of the study integrating the three streams model — problems, 
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policy and politics from Kingdon (1995).  It further elaborates the five broad tools of 
regulation, assessing criteria of tools and their use and applicability in view of four 
generic aspects, namely regulatory power over the trade, soft regulation, institutional 
design and global regulation issues.   
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the financial market in Hong Kong, including four 
major financial industries, the types of regulatory tools adopted by different 
regulators and cross-boundary regulation issues.  It demonstrates the problems stream 
and policy stream described in Chapter 2.   
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the insurance sector to examine the particular tools adopted in 
view of the local political context.  It illustrates the political stream with an 
assessment of the current regulatory regime of insurance sector and further explains 
the deficiencies of the current regulatory system by applying the assessing criteria.   
 
Chapter 5 examines the four alternatives available in the policy-making arena and 
tries to find out a model which is more suitable to fit for the changing socio-economic 
environment and conducive for the long term development of insurance industry in 
Hong Kong.   
 
Chapter 6 concludes the paper by giving a summary of the research project.  Other 
than an overview of the project findings, there is a final discussion on the way 
forward of insurance regulation moving towards the era of integrity, which can only 
11 
 
be attained together with the effort of local and global government in the presence of 
financial stability in Hong Kong, in the region, and over the world.  
 
Looking beyond, Hong Kong is coined by Times Magazine as “Nylonkong” (Elliot, 
2008) which implied its status as an international financial centre on par with New 
York and London.  Surely a robust and comprehensive regulatory system is 
indispensable for Hong Kong to keep pace with the rapid development of financial 
market.   It is hoped that this project can work as a reference for a better regulatory 
regime of the financial sector in Hong Kong.   
12 
 
CHAPTER 2: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
 
Regulation surrounds all of us in our daily life, as part of the social order.  Starting 
from the way we walk across a road, parking a car in a parking lot, waiting for a 
doctor in a clinic, even depositing monies in bank accounts; all these activities exert 
certain degree of control and binding by different entities.  According to Baldwin, 
Scott and Hood (1998, p. 4), the very board definition of regulation comprises “all 
mechanisms of social control or influence affecting behavio[u]r, from whatever 
source, whether intentional or not”.  In a more specific way defined by Freiberg 
(2010, p. 4), regulation means “an intentional measure or intervention that seeks to 
change the behaviour of individuals or groups”.   
 
In a society, the regulatory roles are shared among different agencies and bodies, 
including government agencies and departments, non-governmental groups, trade and 
industry organizations, business and professional associations, etc.  The government, 
however, still plays the most significant role in regulation in many aspects in a 
society as it has the legitimate state and power to carry out regulatory actions.   
 
To help the study on the regulatory system, the regulatory tools approach is adopted 
to examine the essence of regulation — (i) Why do we need to regulate? (ii) How to 
execute the regulation? (iii) How effective is the regulation?  These elements of 
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regulation as explained by Freiberg (2010) together with the concept of three streams 
model proposed by Kingdon (1995) are applied to set the foundation of the analytical 
framework.   
 
Addressing Regulation by the Three Streams Model 
 
In setting up the analytical framework for the project, Kingdon’s (1995) three streams 
model is applied.  It presents a set of process focusing on the agenda setting in the 
policy process, where the problems, policy and political streams are three major 
dimensions of a public issue affect the setting of agenda in the government.   
 
The focus of the project is on the review of current financial sector regulation, which 
is a forward-looking mode in realizing the regulatory tools, their use and application 
in practice and exploring ways to further improve the regulation, rather than a 
backward-looking study on the agenda setting process of a particular public event.  
However, Kingdon’s (1995) three streams model still provides the broad conceptual 
basis of the analytical framework for the exploration and explanation of regulatory 
tools.  The three streams – problems stream, policy stream and political stream – 
represent the important steps of regulation in explaining the reasons for regulation, 
the tools of regulation, and the use and applicability of tools. 
 
According to Kingdon (1995), problems, policy and politics are necessities of policy 
process.   The problems stream is related to problem recognition which attracts the 
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attention of the government and the public.  However, the “[p]roblems are often not 
self-evident by the indicators” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 94), but there should be a focusing 
event to push the government to get the attention to the problem.  The policy stream 
describes how the government generates different policy proposals regarding the 
prevailing environment and how the policy alternatives are debated, selected among 
the policy communities composed of specialists in specific policy areas.  The political 
stream, which is independent of the problems and policy streams, may go along its 
own dynamics and own rules, such as national mood, election results, change of 
administration, change of ideological or partisan distribution in the legislature, etc.  
 
The three streams represent the important dimensions for the government policy 
making process; the model describes the interrelationships among them on how their 
coupling leads to the appearance of a policy window.  Where there is a change in the 
political stream or the emergence of a new problem that captures the attention of 
government officials, the coupling of three streams leads to the opening of a policy 
window.  Though the open window does not stay long, it generates a good 
opportunity for advocators to push their pet policy alternatives and try to take 
advantage of it.   
 
The model provides a contextualized background for the analytical framework in the 
study of financial regulatory tools and their use and application in a particular public 
issue, and how the government can recognize the need for a review on the regulatory 
regime, which is shown in Figure 1 below.   
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Figure 1: Analytical Framework Integrating Regulations and Kingdon’s Three Streams 
Model 
 
 
In regulatory sense, the problems stream identifies the problems in a market where 
the issue becomes a defined problem so that the government “come[s] to believe that 
they should do something about them” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 109); in other words, it 
explains why regulation is needed.  Reasons for regulation include the presence of 
market failure, protection of public interest, a way of risk management, and building 
trust between the public and the market (service or product providers).   It also 
implies social values, norms and other external factors towards regulation by the 
general public.  The policy stream corresponds to how to regulate the issue by the use 
of different regulatory tools; while the political stream relates to the use and 
applicability of tools and its legitimacy in a society.  The level of use and 
applicability is then based on the result in the assessment of tools which evaluate how 
well the regulatory tools are applied to the situation.   
Political Stream: 
Use, Applicability, 
Legitimacy of Tools 
Problems Stream: 
Why Regulate? 
Policy Stream: 
How to Regulate? 
(Regulatory Tools) 
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In the same manner, the three streams represent the important dimensions for the 
government regulation.  When there is a focusing event or any regulatory problem 
catching the attention of government, including a failure of regulatory issues which 
cannot be solved by regulatory tools or an inability to use and apply of regulatory 
tools, a chance arises for advocates to act on the review or reform of the regulatory 
system to maintain its effectiveness and suitability.  Details of three streams are 
discussed in the following sections.   
 
Problems Stream: Why Regulate? 
 
As the first step of designing regulatory tools, it is necessary to understand the 
problems and reasons of regulation.  There are many problems that require 
government regulation.  For simplicity, four core reasons for regulation identified by 
Freiberg (2010, pp. 5-16) are adopted: (i) Market Failure; (ii) Public Interest; (iii) 
Risk Management; and (iv) Trust.   
 
Market Failure  
 
The fundamental reason for regulation is to deal with market failure, which emerges 
from the modern economics considering the properties of an idealized economy.  The 
maximizing behaviour of producers and consumers would lead to the efficient 
allocation of available resources through invisible hand, producing the Pareto-
17 
 
efficient allocation of goods (Weimer and Vining, 1999, p. 74).  The market, however, 
is always inefficient due to many reasons.   
 
Monopoly is one of the reasons.  With too few suppliers in the market, the market 
competition is limited.  Hence the supply of goods and services as well as their prices 
are distorted that the government would regulate the number of suppliers to balance 
the market.   
 
Another cause of market failure is externalities.  As explained by Weimer and Vining 
(1999, p. 94), “an externality is any valued impact, positive or negative, resulting 
from any action that affects someone who did not fully consent to it through 
participation in voluntary exchange”.  If actions taken by a market participant lead to 
some negative impact to another market participant, then market failure occurs.   
 
Information asymmetry also contributes to market failure which renders adversarial 
relationship between producers and consumers.  Weimer and Vining (1999, p. 107) 
cited that “information itself has public good characteristics… there may be 
differences in the level of information relating to the attributes of an externality 
between the generator of the externality and the affected party”.  While there is lack 
of market transparency with limited access to information, it will definitely hinder the 
operation of an efficient market.   
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Public Interest 
 
To a larger extent, the government would act on behalf of its citizens for the 
‘collective good’, the welfare of the society or community, or in the ‘public interest’ 
(McLean, 2004, p. 45).  Public interest might not only imply the interest of majority 
of a society, but also the benefits of affected groups, no matter they are representing 
only a small part of the population.  By Freiberg (2010, pp. 7-8), public interest 
“seeks to reconcile individual and collective as well as present and future interests in 
society through democratic processes”.  Other than utilitarian side, public interest also 
shows the desired regulatory outcomes, such as accountability, transparency and 
human rights.   
 
Risk Management 
 
In modern risk theories, a major role of the government is to manage and distribute 
risks, which relates to a wide range of aspects including social, environmental, 
economic, technical, health and other threats.  Risk and regulation are closely related 
that risk assessment and management are deemed as the leading principles 
underpinning the strategy for regulation.   
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Trust 
 
The ultimate goal of regulation is better understood as in a broader sense for 
achieving the social order.  Regulation is applied for gaining trust and confidence in 
the system as a whole, which is considered as a constituent part of all social 
interactions since social interaction requires regularity and predictability.   
 
The presence of problems is not powerful enough; a focusing event is therefore 
necessary to catch the attention of the public and the government to the problems.  
Focusing event may serve as an advance warning or an indication of a widespread 
problem that needs attention such that it brings people’s awareness of the problems 
and the government considers that it is time to do something about them.   
 
Policy Stream: How to Regulate?  
 
Regulatory tool is a general concept to be conceived as any things of cultural 
significance used by the government to influence human behaviour.  The government 
may utilize different tools or instruments for regulation, but the meaning of ‘tools’ or 
‘instrument’ is not specific and sometimes even vague.  As defined by Salamon (2002, 
p. 19), it is “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to 
address a public problem”.  Gunningham and Grabosky (1998, p. 37) also explained 
that “instruments are the tools employed by institutions to do what they wish to do”.  
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Given an array of regulatory tools, there is no consensus on the classification on type 
of tools.  Still, some scholars tried to classify the regulatory tools by different models.  
One of the earliest models was made by Hood (1983, p. 21), where the tools of 
government were classified by the role of government where they are used (either 
detecting or effecting) and the resources which the government enlist, including 
nodality (information), authority (legal or official power), treasure (monetary 
resources) and organization (capacity).  McDonnell and Elmore (1987, p. 134) 
emphasized the strategies of invention which government can use into mandates, 
inducements, capacity-building and system-changing.  Furthermore, according to the 
underlying modality of control which aims to influence human behaviour, Morgan 
and Yeung (2007, p. 80) classified the regulatory instruments and techniques into 
command (legal rules), competition (economic instruments), communication (social 
norms, disclosure, advertising), consensus (cooperation, contracts, partnerships and 
self-regulation) and code (architecture and techno-regulation).  
 
Based on Freiberg’s (2010) classification and the practical consideration on the study 
of financial sector regulation in this project, five board forms of power or tools of 
government are identified: (i) Command and Control Tools; (ii) Economic Tools, (iii) 
Transactional Tools; (iv) Structural Tools; and (v) Informational Tools.  
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Command and Control Tools 
 
Command and control is state-based regulation focusing mainly on prescriptive rules 
that prohibit or restrict the behaviour and conduct, backed by sanctions; or the 
specification of any activity and subsequent penalty (Gunningham and Grabosky, 
1998, p. 5).  Regulatory sanctions are the essential feature of regulatory enforcement 
of legislation and compliance is to be achieved by punishing those who have 
offended the legislation.   
 
Command and control is the major form of regulatory tools of state regulation, where 
the role of state is the legislator or rule maker in making and implementing all types 
of laws in a society (Freiberg, 2010, p. 21).  It includes three categories of legislative 
instruments — primary legislation, delegated legislation (subordinate legislation) and 
quasi-legislation (soft law).  Both primary and delegated legislation 5  carry the 
authority of state and use the legal rules set by the state to enforce regulation, while 
quasi-legislation is a range of rules, codes of conduct, standards, guidelines, 
agreements and ethics and values complied by regulatees which do not form part of 
the explicit government regulations (Freiberg, 2010, pp. 179-186).   
 
                                                          
5
  According to Freiberg (2010, pp. 183-184), primary legislation such as criminal, civil and 
administrative laws sets the objectives of regulation, specifies offences and penalties, appoints the 
regulatory agencies, defines their power and provides them with ranges of regulatory options and 
power to create delegated legislation or guidelines in relation to the legislation.  It is usually 
supported by delegated or subordinate legislation which includes legal instruments, such as 
statutory rules, regulations, by-laws, ordinances, rules of court and ministerial orders, set by 
agencies or bodies, other than the legislature, whose power is conferred by the primary legislation 
or the state. 
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Apart from the soft law, the government also exercises its power or authority to allow 
or disallow various forms of conduct, through licensing, accreditation, certification, 
registration, permission and litigation.  They are generalized as authorization which 
confers benefits by authorizing or permitting certain conduct which can direct or 
prohibit activities.  Authorization is able to address some kinds of risks, like 
externalities and information asymmetries6.  But it is mainly a preventive tool rather 
than punitive tool, and a proactive means of minimizing the risk of the occurrence of 
harm. 
 
Among the various forms of regulatory tools, legislation plays an important and 
essential role that creates, shapes and enforces regulatory tools.  It forms the 
foundation of regulation because of its ability to give effect on the mechanism of 
legal organizations for purpose of adoption and use of other types of tools addressed 
below through a legitimated authority.  For example, some market-based regulations 
like taxes and quota are necessarily underpinned by coercive legal sanctions applying 
at another level to generate the legal obligation to pay.   
 
                                                          
6
  In some aspects, authorization is similar to informational regulation because it serves as a means 
to address information asymmetries  (Freiberg, 2010, p. 141).  For example, the government can 
control the entry of people into the professions through mandating the requirements before they 
can practice their professional knowledge or expertise to the general public.   
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Economic Tools  
 
To carry out economic regulation or tools 7 , the government aims at “ensuring 
competitive markets for goods and services by providing, limiting or preventing 
access to a market, and avoiding consumer and other harms when such markets are 
not feasible” (May, 2002, p. 157), or “altering the costs and benefits of certain actions, 
and hence introducing a change in the economic, social and environmental behaviour 
of individuals and firms” (Government of Victoria, 2007, p. 2-10).   
 
Under the economic tools approach, a government can ‘make a market’ or ‘influence 
a market’.  If the market failure is due to the absence of a market, the government 
may create such a market as a regulatory tool or policy.  This can be as simple as an 
auction, tender and tradable permit scheme.  On the other hand, the government can 
alter the market conditions by influencing an existing market by different tools or 
policies, for example, changing the level and quality of information available in the 
market, regulating the price, raising taxes and levies, offering bounties and subsidies, 
providing tax expenditures, etc.  All of the above approaches aim to alter both the 
supply and demand sides of the market to encourage a more efficient market 
(Freiberg, 2010, pp. 114-126).   
                                                          
7
  Economic tools are developed with the emergence of new public management which assesses the 
government by market or economic theories.  It emphasizes the efficient allocation of resources at 
the point of ‘equilibrium’, where there is no other allocation of resources would make anyone in a 
society better off without making anyone worse off, with the goal of an overall efficient use of 
capital available, and hence achieving market efficiency.  Under market efficiency, it is necessary 
for governments to regulate or intervene in the market when market failure occurs; that means 
when markets fail to allocate resources efficiently with the presence of monopolies, externalities, 
or asymmetric information  (Freiberg, 2010, pp. 108-109). 
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Informational Tools 
 
Information regulation aims to regulate through disclosure or transparency and to 
enhance information available to the target audience.  It enables access to information 
about products or services that others do not have.  Other than disclosure, information 
regulation also includes performance indicators, credit ratings and capability, advice 
and attitude change.   
 
Information regulation is effective to make the regulated activity public and 
demonstrate the occurrence of government regulation when any harm has been 
identified.  It also encourages others to take action against the non-compliance by 
publicising the harm to the public (Yeung, 2005, p. 37).   
 
Transactional Tools  
 
Transactional tools of regulation, as defined by Freiberg (2010, p. 132), involve 
“regulation that occurs through the direct interaction between parties via a contract, 
grant agreement or other financial agreement under which the parties have a right to 
enter into the arrangement or negotiate its terms”.  It can be in the form of contracts, 
procurement contracts, contract disqualification and grants.   
 
Regulation by contracts is direct and focused, where rights and responsibilities of 
relevant parties can be clearly delineated and make them more accountable.  While 
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contracts are private agreements, they may not be subject to change under the regular 
administrative review which is confined by public power or parliamentary scrutiny 
(Saunders and Yam, 2004, pp. 55 & 61).  
 
Structural Tools 
 
Structural tools are a form of regulation which structure behaviour of people by 
removing or limiting choices available for market participants such that they act in 
accordance with the desired regulatory pattern.  It is common in places where 
“processes are limited by human capacities and frailties, and that failures are 
inevitable due to cognitive, physical or organizational limitations” (Freiberg, 2010, p. 
158).   
 
Regulators can alter the structural process which affects the human behaviour in four 
dimensions — physical design, process design, environmental design and technology.  
Physical design is the basic form of structural regulation by creating spaces to limit 
the physical movement of people or removing instruments of harm.  Process design 
structures the activities or tasks involved in the regulated activities or type of 
businesses systematically to influence human behaviour and reduce non-compliance.  
Environmental design aims to change the attitudes of people and hence their 
behaviour.  By using technology, regulators work through the design of system to 
prevent certain forms of behaviour and activities to operate in the realm of 
information technology (Freiberg, 2010, pp. 159-165).  
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Interrelationships and Interdependencies of Tools 
 
The five board forms of regulations mentioned above are just part of the whole 
picture.  Other forms of regulatory tools, such as authorization, registration, 
permission, licencing, contracting, etc. are other important tools that are heavily 
engaged in the daily operations and activities among business and professional fields 
in the society8.  In view of the increasingly complicated market, what matter most is 
not only the choice of regulatory tools, but the correct and appropriate mix of tools.   
 
In reality, the application of tools is far more complex than the concept of tools, 
because a tool is a ‘package’ of different elements with multiple facets, including the 
nature of good or activity, its delivery vehicle, the delivery system and a set of rules 
defining the relationships of entities within the system (Salamon, 2002, p. 20).  In 
view of the multi-dimension nature of tools, the complication of the human behaviour 
and the social, legal and political cultures affecting the success of tools application, 
regulation usually consists of more than one tool which appear in bundles.  In the 
financial sector regulation, regulators adopt different regulatory tools for effective 
regulation over their regulated entities and persons.  A mix of different tools, 
                                                          
8
 Freiberg (2010, pp. 83-84) argued that state is only one of the actors among the many actors.  
Other regulatory players, such as markets, associations, organizations, regulatory agencies, and 
even the international organizations are also important actors working with the state to achieve the 
regulatory outcomes.  Though there are many regulatory players, one should not overlook that the 
government plays multi-roles in regulation: as economic actors, authorizers, facilitators, trading 
partners and information providers, so as to influence human behaviour from different dimensions 
of regulation and achieve desired regulatory outcomes.   
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including cross-sector regulation, is commonly found nowadays in the complex 
financial market.  Application of various tools is discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
Political Stream: Use, Applicability and Legitimacy of Tools 
 
Regulatory tools may be classified into five broad forms as discussed above, but the 
application of regulatory tools to the policy problem is far more complicated.  It is the 
fact that no tools are perfect to be fit for a public problem which usually involves 
multi-parties, nor is it possible to address a problem by use of a single tool.  In 
addition, the efficiency of tools also depends on other variables such as social, legal, 
and environmental factors.  Hence the forms of the regulation might not follow its 
functions; or in other words, regulatory tools might not be shaped by its application 
or use.   
 
In reality, the use and applicability of regulatory tools may not be rational or logical, 
in which the process is akin to the concept of “garbage can model of organizational 
choice” described by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) for the agenda setting process 
of public policy making.  Under the model, it is difficult to impute a set of preference 
to the decision situation which can satisfy the standard consistency requirements for a 
theory of choice 9 .  It is common that the decision situations do not meet the 
                                                          
9
 The garbage model argues that a choice opportunity is “a garbage can into which various kinds of 
problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated.  The mix of garbage in a 
single can depends on the mix of cans available, on the labels attached to the alternative cans, on 
what garbage is currently being produced, and on the speed with which garbage is collected and 
removed from the scene” (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972, p. 2).  
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conditions for the classical models of decision making.  Similarly, an organization or 
the government usually operates based on an array of inconsistent and ill-defined 
preferences, rather than a coherent structure.  So forms of regulation do not necessary 
follow its functions.   
 
Nonetheless, the use and applicability of regulatory tools (i.e. how well the system of 
regulation is suitable, acceptable or good for a particular public problem) can still be 
assessed based on four generic situations of a regulatory system:  
 
(i) Regulatory Power over the Trade: it mainly focuses on the application of 
legislative instruments — whether the authority (or regulator) has appropriate 
and sufficient regulatory power over the licencees or regulatees in a trade 
industry;  
 
(ii) Soft Regulation (i.e. quasi-legislation): whether the regulatory system works well 
in soft regulation which does not form part of the explicit government regulations;  
 
(iii) Institutional Design: whether the regulatory tools are able to work well under a 
specific institutional design, particularly in balancing the tensions between 
integration and autonomy10 during its application; and  
                                                          
10
 When an authority (or regulator) has greater power in the institutional design, it enjoys greater 
autonomy and has lower level of integration with other authorities or the government.  On the 
contrary, when an authority (or regulator) has less power in the institutional design, it is less 
autonomous but more integrated with other authorities or the government.  In determining such a 
balance usually triggers a lot of discussions and debates among different authorities, the 
government, the trade and the public.   
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(iv) Cross-Boundary / Global Environment Issues: how well the regulatory system 
joins and works together effectively with regulatory systems in other 
trade/industry or country, given the increasingly integrated environment and 
trend of globalization.   
 
Drawing reference to the criteria for assessing the tools of regulation suggested by 
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, pp. 26-31) and the generic situations of the 
regulatory nature, seven assessment criteria are identified: (i) Legitimacy; (ii) 
Effectiveness; (iii) Accountability; (iv) Due Process; (v) Expertise; (vi) Efficiency; 
and (vii) Autonomy.   
 
Legitimacy 
 
As the most fundamental assessment criteria, legitimacy reflects the legal validity or 
legality of the regulatory tools.  The concept of legitimacy (Beetham, 1991, pp. 15-16) 
embodies three distinct elements, including (i) its conformity to established rules; (ii) 
the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs; and (iii) the express 
consent of the subordinate, or of the most significant among them, to the particular 
relations of power.  A tool of regulation is deemed legitimate only if it fulfills three 
levels of character.   
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The idea of legitimacy is an extension of the legislative mandate.  Legislative 
mandate suggests that the regulatory action deserves support or worthy of support (i.e. 
legitimate) when it is authorized by the legislature, which is the origin of democracy 
authority.  Regulators are deemed to fulfill its mandate if they achieve the result of a 
regulatory action as instructed by the legislature of which its representatives are 
chosen by the public (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, pp. 27-28).  One needs to be 
careful in judging the regulatory actions by this criterion because mandate does not 
always satisfy its purpose under various circumstances.  To allow more freedom for 
regulators to deal with the unforeseeable problems in future, such as dynamic 
challenges and risks and advancement of technology, regulatory statutes seldom 
include precise objectives but broad discretions and objectives.  Hence the 
implementation of mandate would depend on the interpretation based on the 
judgment of regulators.   
 
Effectiveness 
 
Measurement of the extent on whether an activity achieves its intended objectives is 
the effectiveness of tools of regulation, which is also the most basic criterion for 
gauging the success of public action (Salamon, 2002, p. 23).  Effectiveness of a tool 
is judged independent of costs, but it is not easy to measure the effectiveness of 
public action.  The purposes and objectives of programmes are often ambiguous, 
setting precise indicators are technically difficult, and there are opportunities to 
influence the program objectives.  Effectiveness of any tools also varies with the 
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circumstances.  It is therefore important to figure out particular tools which are likely 
to be most effective under specified circumstances.   
 
Accountability 
 
Accountability refers to the situation where regulators are properly accountable to, or 
controlled by, democratic institutions, such as the legislature.  A regulatory agency 
might be accountable for its interpretation of its mandate to representative body and 
hence it is necessary to exercise its power in an acceptable way (Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge, 2012, p. 28).  It can also refer to whether regulators in the regulatory system 
can be held responsible for their actions and decisions (Priest, 1997, p. 275).  
Accountability is increasingly important in good governance and public 
administration nowadays, except that it involves extra resources, which might affect 
the pursuit of effective pursuit of regulatory objectives.   
 
Due Process 
 
Due process deals with whether procedures used by regulators are fair, accessible and 
open.  It also includes the level of participation of consumers and affected parties to 
the regulatory decisions and policy process.  The rationale behind is that it is 
legitimate to have proper democratic influence over regulation if due process is 
observed (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, p. 29).  It also relates to the accessibility 
and transparency of regulatory system to regulatees, their clientele and the interested 
32 
 
public (Priest, 1997, p. 275).  In this criterion, the guiding principle of choosing 
stakeholders to participate in the regulatory decisions and process is important, 
because there are trade-offs between more participation and effective decision 
making and implementation of the mandate.   
 
Expertise 
 
Exercise of regulatory functions requires expert judgment.  Experts are those with 
professional knowledge to consider the competing options or values and information 
to come up with the most appropriate decision and achieve the best results, which 
shows the belief of “trust to my expertise” (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2012, pp. 29-
30).  With the affluence of information in the new era, the trust and reliance of the 
public towards experts is weaker than before.  To increase the credibility of experts, it 
is important for experts to explain the issue and their decisions to the public.   
 
Efficiency 
 
Efficiency means to achieve regulatory objectives at the lowest attainable cost given 
the prices of all inputs and the state of knowledge regulating in a productive 
efficiency.  Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, pp. 30-31) made reference to allocative 
efficiency (it is impossible to redistribute goods to make a consumer better off 
without making anyone worse off) and dynamic efficiency (where it encourages 
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desirable process and product innovation and whether the system produces flexible 
responses to changes in demand).   
 
Autonomy 
 
The criterion of autonomy is specific to some trade or industries where the 
independency of tools of regulation is important to the use and applicability of tools.  
As a contrast to integration, some regulatory tools are required to be autonomous 
such that the tools are not be easily affected by external factor or environment, no 
matter the pressure from the public and stakeholders, or even the government.   
 
In the study of insurance regulatory regime in Chapter 4, four generic situations are 
applied to observe the operation of insurance sector, where the use and application of 
relevant regulatory tools are assessed according to seven assessing criteria.   
 
Concluding Considerations 
 
The three streams model conceives three dimensions (problems, policy and politics) 
as necessary aspects in policy making process.  When there are changes in problems 
or political streams catching the government’s attention, the coupling of three streams 
may lead to the opening of a policy window as an opportunity for agenda setting.  
Similarly, when there is a regulatory problem catches the attention of the public and 
the government, the problems, policy and politics of regulation may also merge 
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together which creates a golden opportunity for a review or even a reform on the 
regulatory regime.  
 
While the reasons of regulation, tools of regulation and use and applicability of tools 
represent the problems, policy and political streams respectively, how does the 
framework apply to the financial sector regulation in Hong Kong?  And how well 
does the current regulatory system work based on the assessment criteria proposed in 
the framework?  The analytical framework sets a foundation to bring out Chapters 3 
and 4.  The problems and policy streams of regulation are discussed in Chapter 3, 
including a discussion of the ‘real’ application of regulatory tools by local financial 
regulators, whereas political stream is discussed in Chapter 4 involving a detailed 
evaluation of current insurance regulation in Hong Kong.   
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CHAPTER 3:  OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION IN 
HONG KONG  
 
This chapter describes the overall financial sector regulatory regime in Hong Kong, 
including the current situation of local financial market as well as the regulatory 
system over four major financial sectors –– banking, securities, insurance and 
pension.  Through the analytical lens of problems stream (why) and policy stream 
(how), this chapter examines reasons of regulating the financial market in Hong Kong 
and regulatory tools adopted by different regulators.  It also discusses the problems 
on regulating hybrid products with cross-boundary characteristics, and the 
interrelationships and interdependencies across the four major financial industries.  
Finally, a comparison of regulatory tools adopted by different financial industries 
emerges the limitation of the existing insurance regulatory regime, which is lagged 
behind the development of the financial market and public expectation.   
 
Current Situation of Financial Sector in Hong Kong 
 
The financial sector in Hong Kong comprises mainly the banking, securities, 
insurance and pension industries.  As one of the four key industries, the financial 
sector performs a vital role to the local economy11.  More than 220,000 persons are 
                                                          
11
  There are four key industries in Hong Kong: (i) financial services (including banking, insurance 
and other financial services); (ii) tourism (including inbound and outbound tourism); (iii) trade 
and logistics; and (iv) professional services and other producer services.  Their value added in 
aggregate amounted to HK$1,113 billion or 58.5% of Hong Kong’s GDP in 2011. (Census and 
Statistics Department, 2013a, p. FC4). 
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engaged in the financial sector, representing 6.3% of the total employed population in 
Hong Kong12 .  More importantly, the financial sector generated value added of 
HK$307 billion or 16% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 201113.   
 
Unlike some jurisdictions where there is only a single regulator of the financial 
industry14, Hong Kong regulates different financial services by separate regulatory 
bodies.  The four financial regulators are: (i) Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA); (ii) Securities and Futures Commission (SFC); (iii) OCI; and 
(iv) Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA) for the purposes of 
protecting the interests of depositors, investors, policyholders and pensioners 
respectively.  An introduction of each financial industry and the respective regulator 
is discussed below.  
 
Banking Industry 
 
Hong Kong is one of the world’s largest banking centre, with 200 banking institutions 
from 34 jurisdictions and a network of more than 1,400 branches at the year-end of 
                                                          
12
  The total employment of Hong Kong was 3,579,500 at the year-end of 2012. (Census and 
Statistics Department, 2013a, pp. FC5 & FC6). 
13
  Hong Kong’s GDP at basic prices in 2011 was HK$1,903 billion. (Census and Statistics 
Department, 2013a, pp. FC4 & FC6). 
14
  In some jurisdictions, the regulation of all financial services is under a single regulator, e.g. the 
former Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the United Kingdom, the Authorié de Contrôle 
Prudential of France, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority of Germany, the Financial 
Services Agency of Japan and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS).  On the other hand, 
some jurisdictions like China, Italy and the United States have separate regulators for different 
financial services.  
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2012 (HKMA, 2013b).  Under the three-tier banking system, there are 155 licensed 
banks, 21 restricted licence banks and 24 deposit-taking companies, collectively 
known as ‘authorized institutions’ 15 .  Total assets of all authorized institutions 
amounted to HK$14,858 billion whereas their total deposit liabilities to customers 
reached nearly HK$8,296 billion (HKMA, 2013b), which is almost four times of 
Hong Kong’s GDP of HK$2,084 billion in 2012 (Census and Statistics Department, 
2013b). 
 
The banking industry is regulated by the HKMA established as an independent body 
in 1993.  Its Chief Executive is appointed the Monetary Authority by the Exchange 
Fund Ordinance (Cap. 63), and is also empowered to exercise the functions under the 
Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155) (BO), including authorization, suspension and 
revocation of banks and deposit-taking companies and assumption of control over 
their business (Hsu, 1999).   
 
Securities Industry 
 
The securities and futures markets are operated under The Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK) and Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE) 16.  Hong Kong is among 
                                                          
15
  Only licensed banks may conduct full banking services, including in particular the provision of 
current and savings accounts and acceptance of deposits of any size and maturity.  Restricted 
licence banks may take deposits of any maturity of HK$500,000 or above.  Deposit-taking 
companies may take deposits of HK$100,000 or above with an original maturity of at least three 
months. (HKMA, 2012) 
16
  SEHK (operates the securities market), HKFE (operates the derivatives market) and Hong Kong 
Securities Clearing Company Limited (responsible for central clearing and settlement system of 
38 
 
the top five global listing markets, with a total market capitalization of HK$21,953 
billion as at 31 March 2013 and an average daily turnover of HK$74 billion in the 
first quarter of 2013 (SFC, 2013b).  There were around 1,500 listed companies and 30 
automated trading services providers as at 31 March 2013.  Moreover, there were 
39,300 licensed persons, including 1,800 securities brokerage firms, futures dealers, 
securities margin financiers, and their representatives (Government of HKSAR, 
2012).  
 
The securities industry is regulated by the SFC, which is an independent regulator 
established in 1989 to execute the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) (SFO).  
Similar to HKMA, SFC also has a wide range of investigative, remedial and 
disciplinary powers under the SFO to regulate the securities and futures markets in 
Hong Kong, including the listed companies, trading services providers and licensed 
persons mentioned above.   
 
Insurance Industry 
 
As one of the most open insurance centre in the world,  Hong Kong had 154 
authorized insurers in Hong Kong, including 44 long term (life) insurers, 91 general 
(non-life) insurers and 19 composite (life and non-life) insurers (OCI, 2013a).  The 
total premiums in 2012 amounted to HK$255 billion (HK$39 billion from general 
                                                                                                                                                                     
market) are hold by Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx), which is a listed company act as the operator 
and frontline regulator of central securities and derivatives markets in Hong Kong.  HKEx mainly 
regulates listed issuers, administers listing, trading and clearing rules, and serves the wholesale 
customers of exchanges and clearing houses.   
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business and HK$216 billion from long term business) (OCI, 2013b), accounting for 
more than 12.5% of Hong Kong’s GDP.  The insurance sector also provides lots of 
job opportunities for the industry.  There are more than 73,000 individual insurance 
intermediaries17.   
 
The insurance industry is regulated by the OCI, which is a government department 
under the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (FSTB).  OCI is headed by the 
Commissioner of Insurance, appointed by the Chief Executive as the Insurance 
Authority (IA) under the Insurance Companies Ordinance (Cap. 41) (ICO).  The 
regulatory framework of insurance is divided into two parts — OCI authorizes and 
directly regulates the insurers, while the insurance intermediaries are regulated under 
the self-regulatory system which is maintained by industry bodies, including the 
Hong Kong Federation of Insurers (HKFI) and two approved bodies of insurance 
brokers 18 .  Unlike the banking, securities and pension industries, OCI does not 
regulate the insurance products available in the market, which are treated as private 
contracts between insurers and policyholders.   
 
                                                          
17
 These insurance intermediaries include 9,028 chief executives and technical representatives of 613 
broker firms, 27,868 responsible officers and technical representatives of 2,406 agency firms, and 
36,875 individual agents as at 31 March 2013.  (OCI, 2013a).   
18
  The two approved bodies of insurance brokers are The Hong Kong Confederation of Insurance 
Brokers (HKCIB) and the Professional Insurance Brokers Association (PIBA). 
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Pension Industry 
 
The pension industry refers to the mandatory provident fund (MPF) system19 and 
includes the voluntary occupational retirement schemes (also called the ORSO 
schemes)20.  As a mandatory scheme, the coverage of MPF system is extremely wide 
and growing rapidly.  It covers more than 3.16 million employees.  As at 31 March 
2013, the total asset values amounted to HK$717 billion (MPFA, 2013), representing 
35% of Hong Kong’s GDP in 2012.  There were 19 approved trustees and around 
33,900 registered intermediaries for the MPF schemes, providing 41 MPF schemes 
with 469 approved constituent funds and 300 approved pooled investment funds 
available in the market (MPFA, 2013).   
 
The MPF system is regulated by the MPFA, which is established in 1998 under the 
Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance (Cap. 485) (MPFO) in 1995 to 
regulate, supervise and monitor the MPF system and the trustees.  MPFA does not 
directly regulate the registered intermediaries selling MPF schemes, where the 
intermediaries are all licencees of insurance, banking or securities sector who are 
regulated by the frontline regulators.   
 
                                                          
19
  The MPF system is a privately managed, employment-related mandatory system of provident fund 
schemes for the retirement of local workforce upon the age of 65.  Employer and employee, or 
self-employed person, are each required to make contributions of 5% of the relevant income of the 
employee, or self-employed person. 
20
  ORSO schemes referring to those schemes registered under the Occupational Retirement Schemes 
Ordinance (ORSO), which are exempted schemes under the MPF system.   
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A Synthesis of the Four Industries and their Regulation 
 
The regulation of financial market in Hong Kong, comprising the four industries as 
mentioned above, is headed by the Financial Secretary, who oversees the formulation 
and implementation of policies in financial, monetary, trade and employment as well 
as economic matters.  The Financial Secretary is supported by the Secretary for 
Financial Services and the Treasury (SFST), through the Permanent Secretary for 
Financial Services, to direct and formulate government policies and relevant 
regulatory issues with the goals, among other things, to maintain and enhance 
Hong Kong's status as a major international financial centre, and to co-ordinate with 
various financial regulators to ensure Hong Kong's regulatory regime meeting the 
needs of modern commerce. 
 
The four components of financial sector are important and have their own significant 
contributions to the overall economic development in Hong Kong.  However, one 
should not overlook that the pivotal interrelationships and independencies among the 
four industries.  The rapid development of financial market results in increasingly 
complicated financial products nowadays, which contributes to the importance of 
cross-boundary regulation requiring closer and more advanced communication 
among different regulators.  The emergence of more variety of financial products 
explains part of the regulatory problems on one hand and affects the applicability and 
effectiveness of regulatory tools adopted by regulators on the other, both of which are 
discussed in details in Chapter 4.    
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Figure 2 summarizes the key features of the four financial markets and their 
respective regulators.  
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Figure 2: Financial Markets and Respective Regulators in Hong Kong 
Financial Industry Sectors Banking Securities Insurance Pension 
Regulator 
(year of establishment) 
HKMA 
(1993) 
SFC 
(1989) 
OCI 
(1990) 
MPFA 
(1998) 
Institutional set-up Independent Authority Independent Authority Government Department Independent Authority 
Governing body /  
Reporting to 
Financial Secretary Board of Directors Financial Secretary via SFST Management Board 
Sources of finance 
Exchange Fund (100%) Levies (76%) 
Fees (16%) 
Investment (8%)  
Government revenue (100%) Investment returns on 
Capital Grant (97%)  
Fees (3%) 
Staffing ~800  ~600  ~130 ~700 
Staff costs ~HK$900 million ~HK$650 million No separate staff costs, 
subsumed under FSTB 
~HK$400 million 
Number of Regulated 
entities 
155 Licensed banks  
21 Restricted licence banks 
24 Deposit-taking 
companies  
All banking employees 
3 Exchanges companies 
(under due filing with SFC 
and SEHK/FEHK) 
~1,500 Listed companies  
~40,000 Licensed persons  
~160 Authorized insurers  
~70,000 Insurance 
intermediaries (under the 
regulation of self-regulatory 
organizations) 
19 Approved trustees  
~30,000 MPF intermediaries  
Regulated products 
Deposits Investment products  (e.g. 
MPF funds, ILAS) 
No regulation on insurance 
products 
~40 MPF schemes  
~5,300 ORSO schemes  
~850 MPF investment funds  
Sources: Respective websites and latest annual reports of HKMA, SFC, OCI and MPFA 
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Problems Stream: Reasons for Regulating the Financial Sector 
 
Given the significance of financial sector, any distress or crisis in the financial sector 
would materially affect Hong Kong’s economic and political stability (Feng, 2007; Feng 
and Mee, 2008; HKFI, 1998).  It has long been found that social habits or informal 
mechanisms are inadequate for protecting people from the harm when the market fails to 
deliver the desired products, or there is lack of public confidence in the market.  Then, 
naturally, the public look for the government to act on their behalf to produce some 
regulatory measures and control the behaviour of both producers and consumers.  Before 
proceeding to the reasons for regulating financial sector, it is necessary first to look for 
how the Hong Kong government governs the economy as a whole.   
 
Changing Governing Philosophy for Economic Policy  
 
In the colonial period, the Hong Kong government’s economic policy was governed by 
the positive non-interventionism, which the government accounted it as one of the 
success factors in the economic development of Hong Kong before 1980s.  “[I]t is 
normally futile and damaging to the growth rate of an economy, particularly an open 
economy, for the government to attempt to plan the allocation of resources available to 
private sector and to frustrate the operation of market forces …” (by the former Financial 
Secretary Sir Philip Haddon-Cave and quoted by Yam (1998)).  Under this philosophy, 
the government was the staunch believer of free economy and market competition where 
market actions were considered as more efficient than government actions, and it always 
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upheld the approach of ‘big market, small government’ in its governance.  This governing 
philosophy worked well in the past because the participation of civil society in 
government policies was limited at that time.  The regulation on financial industries was 
also one the same line that regulation would only be imposed on a ‘problem-solving 
basis’ when problems occurred which could not be fixed by the market.   
 
However, the introduction of direct elections to the LegCo in 1991 has rendered an 
increasingly less manageable political environment.  The rise of party politics and new 
political players demanded a share of power by criticizing government policies.  The 
situation in the past decade was even worse.  The institutional design of political system 
under ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement cannot bring about fully fledged 
democracy in the postcolonial period, renders Hong Kong as a “semi-democracy state” 
(Lee et al., 2013, pp. 1-3).  Given the semi-democracy circumstance and the rapidly 
growing civil society, traditional means of public participation through advisory 
committees can no longer work well in such dynamic political environment.  The 
government gets no choice but has to start changing its governing philosophy to intervene 
the market during undesirable situations.   
 
Both the changes in political atmosphere and financial market cause the financial 
regulators to adjust their regulatory strategies more proactively.  Other than the changes 
of political environment, there are many other generic reasons for the government to 
intervene and regulate the financial industries more frequently and intensively than before.  
In Chapter 2, four core reasons are cited for the need of regulation by Freiberg (2010, pp. 
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5-16), namely market failure, public interest, risk management and trust.  In reality, these 
reasons can be found in all financial industries mentioned above.  
 
As a Remedy to Market Failure 
 
The major reason for financial sector regulation is to deal with the market failure, which 
is attributed to many factors.  The first one is information asymmetry that renders 
adversarial relationship between producers (financial institutions) and consumers 
(investors).  Comparing to other industries, the financial sector always involve 
transactions of technical and professional knowledge.  With the rapid development of 
financial market in the past decades, there are more and more complicated financial 
products being available for individual investors, such as exchanged traded funds, real 
estate investment trust, mini-bonds and investment-linked insurance schemes (ILAS).  
The complex nature of these financial contracts makes it difficult for financial 
practitioners to understand, let alone individual consumers without relevant knowledge.  
It renders the unequal bargaining power between financial institutions and consumers and 
the latter are vulnerable to abusive marketing by the former.  Regulation is therefore 
deemed necessary to ensure that contracts offered by financial institutions are fair, selling 
strategy is appropriate and the price is reasonable.   
 
Another reason leading to market failure is to curtail the power of monopoly.  Since the 
entry barrier of being providers (i.e. financial institutions) of financial products are 
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usually very high21, with stringent requirements on its assets, capital and solvency ratios, 
the ones who can join the financial market are either conglomerates or international 
financial corporations.  Hence the market participants in financial industry are prone to 
business collusions and mergers, which reduce market competition, monopolize the 
market and control the prices easily.  
 
To Protect Public Interest 
 
The second rationale explained by Freiberg (2010, p. 6) for the regulation of financial 
sector is due to the public interest — the government regulates for the collective interests 
or welfare of the society or community.   Similarly, the financial sector is an industry that 
is vested in the public interest.  Majority of services provided by financial institutions, 
especially the banking, pension and insurance services, are deemed necessary for the 
general public.  It has long been held that financial services are pervasive in its influence 
and sometimes, the failure of financial market, like insurance, can affect persons that are 
not directly involved in the transaction, which can be considered as public interest.   
 
In addition, financial products are fiduciary nature (Vaughan and Vaughan, 1999, p. 95).  
Individuals make use of financial products to accumulate adequate cash flow for 
particular use in future (like deposits or pension schemes) or protect against financial loss 
                                                          
21
 For example, a bank shall meet the minimum capital adequacy ratio and liquidity ratio requirements 
under Parts XVII and XVIII of the BO and an insurer the minimum paid-up capital (say, HK$10 
million for a general business insurer) and solvency (say, also HK$10 million for a general business 
insurer) requirements under sections 8 and 10 of the ICO respectively.  It is noted that these are the 
minimum requirements and actual amounts are usually much higher.   
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at a later time (like insurance).  It is important to the public welfare that financial 
institutions should fulfill their promises to repay consumers or indemnify insured in 
future.  Financial services are therefore subject to government regulation because of its 
fiduciary nature which holds vast sums of money in trust for the public.   
 
As a Way to Manage Risk  
 
Regulation is considered as the management and distribution of unacceptable risks 
(Morgan and Yeung, 2007, pp. 13-14).  As shown in the history of financial market, there 
is a natural tendency in financial industry where market participants tend to challenge 
each other in fight for greater market share by the keenest sort of cut-throat competition 
without properly considering the relevant risks involved22.  This may result in inadequate 
prices and some of the market participants are forced to close down after a period of time.  
The phenomenon is common in insurance market that the excessive price cut would not 
be aware because of its special nature — the full cost of an insurance contract will only 
be incurred until the insurance contract has reached its full term.  It would lead to 
“destructive competition” where all insurers might be forced to cut their prices below 
costs to retain their market share which will lead to great financial risk in long term 
(Vaughan and Vaughan, 1999, p. 96).  This also explains the government or regulators do 
                                                          
22
 One of the examples is Anglo Starlite Insurance Company Limited which was placed into provisional 
liquidation on 8 May 2009 following an investigation by the Insurance Authority.  It was generally 
believed that the cut-throat competition among mobile insurers led to the close down of Anglo Starlite.  
Another example was found in banking industry (OCI, 2009).  In mid-2010, there was a competition of 
market share by banks that all of them cut the mortgage rate to a risky level.  HKMA investigated the 
situation and communicated with banks, followed by the prudential measures for residential mortgage 
loans that regulated the lowest mortgage rate of at least 2% offered by banks to enhance risk 
management of banking system (HKMA, 2010).  
- 49 - 
 
affect the price of financial products during the time of irregular market, even though 
Hong Kong is a free financial market.   
 
Financial stability of institutions is another concern over risk management which requires 
regulation.  As it is impossible for consumers to properly assess financial institutions’ 
financial strength in relation to its prices and quality of services, it is essential for the 
government to impose high capital and liquidity requirements and constrain institutions’ 
investments and other transactions to reduce the probability of insolvency to zero.  
Regulation can avoid excessive financial risk and help the institutions better manage their 
risks for longer term development.   
 
To Build Trust in the Community 
 
Freiberg (2010, p. 6) explained that “at the broadest level, the role of government 
regulation is to create order and engender trust and confidence in the system as a whole”.  
This rationale is particularly important after the Lehman Brothers mini-bond incident in 
2008, where thousands of investors entrusted the banking employees in buying the mini-
bonds as secured investment products but finally turned up in losing all of their savings 
overnight.  In rebuilding customers’ confidence, local regulators, as led by the Hong 
Kong government, have implemented a series of measures to enhance regulatory 
requirements 23  for the sales of certain financial products, such as the extension of 
                                                          
23
 In response to the public outcry for more stringent regulations on the sales of financial products after 
the Lehman Brothers mini-bond incident, HKMA, SFC and OCI introduced a serious of measures to 
reduce the problem of risk suitability mismatch between customers and financial products in mid-2011, 
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cooling-off period, prohibition of offering gifts or financial incentives to promote 
financial products, assessment of customers’ risk tolerance level by conducting financial 
needs analysis and risk profile questionnaire, audio-recording of salient parts of sales 
process, etc.   
 
Having gone through the situations and reasons why the regulation of financial sector is 
necessary and beneficial to the industry, public and society for building trust and nurture 
an environment conducive to the development of financial sector in long term.  But what 
regulatory tools do regulators apply to financial industries and how do they apply with 
different mix and match according to the characteristics of operation and products?   
 
Policy Stream: Regulatory Tools in the Financial Sector  
 
In the regulation of financial sector, regulators take various kinds of regulatory tools 
targeting different licencees and financial transactions or activities.  These regulatory 
tools, largely based on Freiberg’s (2010) classification, can be divided into five broad 
forms, including command and control, economic, information, transactional and 
structural, but to a different extent based on their own circumstances and historical 
development.  A summary of these regulatory tools adopted by different financial 
regulators is shown in Figure 3.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
especially on the sales of ILAS products and Unlisted Structured Investment Products to vulnerable 
customers (examples include (i) the elderly (aged 65 or above); (ii) visually impaired; (iii) illiterate or 
those with low education level (primary or below); and (iv) those who have limited means and/or no 
regular sources of income).  All licencees of these regulators are required to follow the new 
requirements and provide adequate training for front-line employees (HKMA, 2011).   
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Figure 3: Regulatory Tools Adopted by Different Financial Regulators  
Regulatory 
Tools 
Banking Securities Insurance Pension 
Command & 
Control 
BO (Cap. 155) + codes and 
guidelines : 
Legal - authorization  
Enforcement power: 
investigation and sanctions 
SFO (Cap. 571) + codes and 
guidelines :  
Legal - licensing  
Extensive enforcement power 
ICO (Cap. 41) + guidance notes 
and guidelines :  
Legal - authorization 
Enforcement power: limited 
intervention and withdrawal 
MPFSO (Cap. 485) + codes 
and guidelines :  
Legal - approval 
Extensive enforcement power 
Economic  Limited power on financial 
penalties  
Deposit Protection Scheme  
Financial penalties 
Investor Compensation Fund 
Unified Exchange 
Compensation Fund 
Very limited power on financial 
penalties  
Limited financial compensation 
(motor + employees 
compensation) 
Compulsory contributions  
Financial penalties 
MPF Compensation Fund 
Informational Financial disclosure  
Market statistics 
Additional financial 
information 
Complaint statistics  
Product disclosure 
Market information  
Complaint statistics 
Enforcement news 
Financial disclosure  
Market statistics  
No complaint statistics  
Product disclosure 
Fee disclosure 
Complaint statistics   
Transactional Advertisement Sales and marketing activities No regulation on insurance 
contracts  
Sales and marketing activities  
Structural 3-tier system 
HK Association of Banks 
DTC Association 
HKEx is the holding company 
of SEHK and HKFE which are 
both operators and frontline 
regulators 
Direct supervision of insurers 
Self-regulation of intermediaries 
by HKFI and SROs (i.e. IARB, 
HKCIB, PIBA)  
MPF system (employers, 
employees, trustees) 
Sources: Respective websites and latest annual reports of HKMA, SFC, OCI and MPFA
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Command and Control Tools 
 
Command and control has always been the major form of regulatory tools to permit 
or restrict any specific entities, products or activities, the financial sector is no 
exception.  Majority of regulatory powers of regulators come from the legislation, 
including BO, SFO, ICO and MPFSO which are extended by subsidiary legislation 
and regulatory codes or guidelines.  Through the legislation and specific codes and 
guidelines, financial market is restricted to those who have obtained authorization24 
and registration 25 , including the financial institutions and their employees and 
representatives, subject to on-going regulation and supervision by regulators.  
Nevertheless, the scope and intensity of command and control vary among regulators 
due to their different regulatory philosophies, historical developments and special 
industry features.   
 
For instance, SFC and MPFA are empowered under their legislations to exercise the 
most extensive enforcement and investigation powers; the former can impose a wide 
                                                          
24
 Companies are prohibited to carry on banking or insurance business or their names are restricted 
to use the word ‘bank’ or ‘insurance’ unless they have obtained proper authorization from HKMA 
under section 97 of the BO and OCI under section 56A of the ICO respectively.  Moreover, chief 
executives, directors and controllers such as key shareholders of a bank or insurer are required to 
fulfill the fit and proper criteria stipulated by regulators to run the bank or insurer under the BO 
and ICO respectively, of which some of them are even required to obtain prior approval from the 
respective regulators. 
25
 Those persons engaging in securities dealing and MPF selling are required to be licensed directly 
by SFC and MPFA under the respective licensing systems but insurance intermediaries are 
indirectly regulated by OCI through their registrations with the self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs).  In respect of products, approvals of investment and MPF schemes should be obtained 
from SFC and MPFA but deposits are only supervised by HKMA and insurance products are even 
not regulated by OCI at all. 
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range of supervisory, monitoring and enforceable regulatory sanctions on listed 
companies and licensed persons but the latter can only impose fines on employers 
mainly.  Similarly, HKMA and OCI have similar supervisory and regulatory powers 
such as financial and control regulations (e.g. capital requirements, liquidity or 
solvency, and corporate governance); the former is empowered to carry out 
investigations but the latter has neither investigation nor sanction powers under the 
legislation. 
 
Economic Tools  
 
Different economic tools are applied to the financial industries to help the market 
moving to the equilibrium and achieving a more efficient market.  Regulators (except 
OCI) may impose penalties for licencees against their illegal activities or undesirable 
actions against the consumers’ interests.  On the other hand, various kinds of 
protection funds are set up to further protect consumers’ interests in the financial 
transactions.  For example, the public are protected by the Deposit Protection Scheme 
for their local currency or foreign currency deposits in banks, while securities 
investors and MPF Schemes members are under the protection of Investor 
Compensation Fund and MPF Compensation Funds respectively, for their loss of 
benefits that are attributable to the misfeasance or illegal conduct committed by 
relevant financial institutions or their licensed intermediaries26.   
                                                          
26
  In the event of a bank failure, the Deposit Protection Scheme administered by the Hong Kong 
Deposit Protection Board will pay a compensation of up to a maximum of HK$500,000 to each 
depositor  under the Deposit Protection Scheme Ordinance (Cap. 581).  Similarly, if there is any 
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In comparison to other financial industries, the insurance industry has less 
comprehensive protection over the policyholders.  Insurance compensation funds are 
only available for the compulsory insurance (i.e. employees’ compensation insurance 
and motor insurance) and administered by the industry bodies.  However, the 
compensation of policyholders in face of the insolvency risk of insurers for other 
classes of insurance business under the Policyholder Protection Fund is still under 
consideration and development27. 
 
Informational Tools 
 
As it is costly, if not impossible, for the public to obtain the information of financial 
institutions, such as their financial strengths, capital and liquidity requirements and 
accounting reports for reference, information disclosure has always been an important 
regulatory tool for regulators.  In Hong Kong, financial institutions are required to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
default of exchange participants and financial or MPF intermediaries, securities investors and 
MPF Schemes members will be under the respective protection of the Investor Compensation 
Fund administered by the Investor Compensation Company Limited under Part XII of the SFO 
with a compensation of up to HK$150,000, and the Compensation Fund administered by the 
MPFA with a compensation for the accrued benefits under section 17 of the MPFO.  Sources: 
Respective websites of HKMA, SFC and MPFA. 
27
 For any insolvency of insurers, there are currently two compensation funds for the compulsory 
insurance businesses of employees’ compensation and motor vehicles.  These compensation funds 
are administered by the Employees’ Compensation Insurer Insolvency Bureau and the Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong respectively.  On the other, the consultation conclusions of the 
Policyholder Protection Fund proposal for other classes of insurance business was released in 
January 2012 and the relevant legislative proposal will be tabled on the LegCo in 2013-14.   
(FSTB and OCI, 2012).   
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report their financial situation to regulators regularly28; and disclose financial, market 
and complaints related information and statistics to the public, so that consumers are 
able to obtain the latest information about changes in the industry.  However, the 
level of information disclosure is not subject to same standard over different 
industries.  For example, insurance industry has an exception that complaint statistics 
of both insurers and insurance intermediaries are not disclosed while those of other 
industries are disclosed and announced publicly.   
 
After the Lehman Brothers mini-bond incident, financial institutions are required to 
disclose the risk-related factors and information of financial products in a more 
explicit way so that consumers have adequate understanding of their acceptable risks 
level to make informed decisions.  For example, SFC standardized the presentation 
structure for a range of investment products in the Product Key Fact Statements29 so 
that investors can grasp the key issues and risks of a product before investing.  For 
the selling of ILAS products30 , insurance intermediaries are required to conduct 
                                                          
28
 For example, the Monetary Statistics Ordinance (Cap. 356) requires authorized institutions to 
submit statistical returns to HKMA for the purpose of monitoring the developments of the 
monetary sector.   
29
 Investment products marketed to public, namely funds, ILAS and unlisted structured investment 
products, are required to provide a Product Key Fact Statement containing a concise and user 
friendly summary, in plain language with key features and risks of a product, including name and 
type of product, name of issuer, quick facts, how does it work, key risks, fees and charges, etc.  
(IEC, 2013) 
30
 ILAS product is an example of complex insurance products.  It is a life insurance policy issued by 
an insurance company with the net premiums paid by policyholder invested in underlying funds 
according to their investment options or in any manner at the ILAS’s issuers discretion.  Different 
from traditional insurance, the return of ILAS upon maturity is subject to the performance of 
underlying funds with no guarantee, except for death benefits.  Despite any forms of investment, 
the nature of an ILAS remains an insurance contract between the ILAS issuer and the investor or 
policyholder.  As such, the underlying funds invested by consumers under an ILAS are the assets 
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financial needs analysis and risk profile questionnaire to assess the financial situation 
and risk appetite of consumers and to determine if a particular product and its 
underlying investment choices are suitable for them.  More disclosure requirements 
are to be made by insurers and insurance intermediaries since mid-2013, such as the 
commission disclosure in the new compulsory Important Fact Statements (providing 
a summary of product feature, similar to Product Key Fact Statements) and post-sale 
calls extended from vulnerable customers to all customers (HKFI, 2013). 
 
Transactional Tools 
 
Financial regulators have other kinds of restrictions on the transactions of financial 
products, particularly on the promotion strategies targeting individual investors.  Both 
SFC and MPFA have regulatory guidelines on the sales and marketing of financial 
products, while HKMA has certain restrictions on the advertisement of authorized 
institutions (including banks or restricted licence banks).   
 
However, insurance industry has very limited regulation by transactional tools.  
Regulation on insurers’ marketing strategies by OCI is limited.  As insurance 
contracts are treated as business contracts between insurers and consumers, OCI 
largely does not regulate contents of contracts or details of transactions.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the ILAS-issuing insurance company and subject to the credit and insolvency risk of the ILAS 
issuer.   
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Structural Tools 
 
The regulatory regime and its structure designed by each financial regulator is not the 
same due to the unique characteristics of products offered and transactions involved.  
Banks are allocated into different categories under the 3-tier system where deposit-
taking institutions operate under different restrictions to reduce risks.  Securities and 
futures markets are operated under the regulation of HKEx with two subsidiaries 
SEHK and HKFE, responsible for the stock exchange market and futures exchange 
market respectively, but also reporting to SFC under a ‘due filing’ system31.  Under 
the tri-party arrangement, MPF schemes are also held in trust of authorized trustees 
under the stringent regulation of MPFA.   
 
Structural regulation of insurance, however, is different from others (that the whole 
market is regulated by a single independent regulator), where only half of the regime 
is in the control of a government department (i.e. OCI) while the other half is in the 
hand of three industry bodies.    
 
                                                          
31
  Under the due filing system, a prospective listed company must file applications and materials 
with SFC via SEHK.  Although SEHK is the frontline regulators of the securities market,  SFC 
retains the direct regulation of the market and can exercise enforcement powers against persons 
providing false or misleading listing information.  (SFC, 2013c). 
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Cross-Boundary Regulation 
 
Emergence of hybrid-products in the rapid development of financial industries has 
blurred the boundaries between traditional financial industries.  Traditional regulatory 
tools discussed above are no longer as efficient and effective as they were in the old 
days.  For instance, ILAS products are investment-linked products issued by insurers 
with both investment and insurance elements but are sold to individual consumers by 
bank employees or insurance intermediaries.  If there is a complaint over an ILAS 
product, it needs the cooperation of SFC, OCI and HKMA to finish the investigation.  
As ILAS products are authorized by SFC for fulfilling investment products 
requirements, they are issued by insurer under the supervision of OCI; and the 
process of sales usually take place in an authorized institution subject to regulation of 
HKMA.  The typical investigation and complaint handling process may not be useful 
for ILAS products.   
 
To catch up with the market development, regulators are required to merge or revise 
their regulatory tools for those complicated products.  A platform for mutual 
assistance and information exchange is essential for different regulators to closely 
collaborate with each other to carry out effective regulation over the possible 
loopholes across the industries, though each regulator may have its own concern and 
agenda over the cross-boundary regulatory issues32.   
                                                          
32
 Regardless of the fact that the four regulators have signed various kinds of agreements such as 
memorandum of understanding  on specific operations and information exchange.   
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Concluding Considerations 
 
Given the significance of financial sector to the economy of Hong Kong, the existing 
financial regulatory regime is a comprehensive one to deal with the problems of 
market failure, protecting public interest, managing risk and building trust.  Though 
regulators have been applying different regulatory tools according to the unique 
characteristics of respective financial industries, regulatory regime over four 
industries are not unified in terms of their institutional set-up, financing and 
operations, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness.   
 
Both HKMA and OCI are part of the Hong Kong government and ultimately report to 
the Financial Secretary but their establishment and staffing arrangements are totally 
different.  HKMA, SFC and MPFA are independent bodies with own finances and 
budgets but OCI remains as a government department and fully financed by 
government revenues.  Owing to the constraints of government budget, OCI is the 
smallest among the regulators but it regulates the highest number of regulated 
entities33.  On products regulation, other regulators regulate their respective products 
but OCI does not.  
 
                                                          
33
 As at 31 March 2013, OCI had a total staff of some 130 (including 100 professional grade staff 
and  30 general grade staff).  The establishment of OCI is very small in view of the number of 
regulated entities and registered persons (163 authorized insurers under direct regulation of OCI 
and around 70,000 insurance intermediaries under self-regulatory system) (OCI, 2013a).  
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Regulatory tools adopted by OCI are similar to HKMA based on the legal 
background of the ICO and BO.  However, the power of HKMA is more extensive 
and protection for consumers is more comprehensive than those of OCI after its own 
developments for decades.  For example, the Deposit Protection Scheme for the 
protection of bank customers was established in 2006 but the Policyholder Protection 
Fund is still being developed for the insurance industry.  Another major difference 
between OCI and other regulators is the structural tool where the self-regulatory 
system for intermediaries still remains in the insurance industry whereas those in the 
banking and securities markets have ceased for a long time.   
 
The preliminary comparison of regulatory tools accentuated the limitation of OCI’s 
development compared to other financial regulators in the past decades owing to its 
dependent status as a government department.  The next chapter evaluates the Hong 
Kong insurance regulatory regime in details.   
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CHAPTER 4: EVALUATON OF EXISTING INSURANCE REGULATION 
 
This chapter considers the political streams for the financial sector regulation. It 
assesses the use, applicability and legitimacy of the regulatory tools in the existing 
insurance industry against the seven criteria set out in Chapter 2.  There is an 
introduction on the regulatory regime of insurance sector in Hong Kong, and a 
thorough assessment on whether such regime is suitable in the context of the Hong 
Kong insurance industry.  During the assessment, four generic situations, including 
the regulatory power over the trade, soft regulation, institutional design and global 
environment, are applied specifically in the insurance regulation, with reference to 
criteria suggested by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, pp. 26-31), namely legitimacy, 
effectiveness, accountability, due process, expertise, efficiency and autonomy.   
 
Overview of Regulatory Framework of the Insurance Industry in Hong Kong 
 
The insurance industry in Hong Kong is regulated by OCI, which was established in 
1990.  OCI is led by a public officer, the IA, who is appointed by the Chief Executive 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).  The IA is supported by 
a group of professional civil servants to discharge his function.   
 
Currently, OCI is a government department subsumes under the FSTB.  It is the only 
financial regulator which is still under the governmental structure.  Contrary to the 
ideal principle of function over form, OCI’s function is greatly confined by its form 
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while it takes on the role as a government body to perform its statutory functions to: 
(i) regulate and supervise the insurance industry (including insurers and insurance 
intermediaries) for the promotion of the general stability of insurance industry and (ii) 
protect policyholders.  OCI delivers its functions based on the regulatory power 
derived from IA under the legislation, including the power in authorization of 
insurers and regulation and supervision of insurers’ on-going compliance with the 
legislation.  However, OCI does not regulate the insurance intermediaries (including 
agents and brokers) direct, and allows the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to do 
so.  The relationship between OCI, insurers, SROs and insurance intermediaries are 
illustrated in Figure 4 below.   
 
Figure 4: Regulatory Arrangements of Insurance Industry in Hong Kong 
 
 
On the power arrangement, OCI adopts the idea of elitism in governance and 
constitutes elites to govern the insurers.  These elites (insurance officers) have the 
power to conduct regular and special financial examinations and on-site inspections 
OCI 
Insurers Self-regulatory 
organizations 
Insurance 
Intermediaries 
Regulate 
Principal-agent 
relationship 
Regulate 
Oversee 
Collaborate 
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of insurers, or impose restrictions on their new business of insurers or its investment 
portfolio, custody of their assets, etc.  Other than elitism, OCI depends on self-
regulatory regime of insurance intermediaries in the form of pluralism, where 
regulatory power over insurance intermediaries is dispersed to SROs, which exert 
influence by using their resources.  Different SROs are expected to have a role in 
ensuring stability of the insurance industry and protecting the rights of policyholders 
in the insurance industry.   
 
In the old days when OCI was newly established, the involvement of SROs has its 
merit to avoid dominance of power concentrated in the elitist management of OCI.  
Self-regulatory regime allows those familiar with the industry operation to have a 
better position in grasping the crux of problems.  OCI does not have the power to 
regulate the intermediaries directly, but allows SROs to manage their performance 
based on the soft regulations and make sure that insurance intermediaries comply 
with the Code of Practice endorsed by IA.  Supported by such soft regulation, SROs 
are responsible for handling all complaints against insurance intermediaries, 
including investigation, adjudication and imposition of disciplinary action.  Therefore, 
the regulation of insurance intermediaries heavily depends on the self-regulatory 
regime by SROs.   
 
However, such forms of regulation over insurance industry do not help OCI perform 
its functions ideally.  Problems were exacerbated with the prevalence of hybrid 
insurance products.  The financial crisis in 2008, in which thousands investors 
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suffered from the mini-bonds incident, act as the focusing event which triggered the 
public outcry for more protection of consumers and finally caught the government’s 
attention to the need to carry out a review of the insurance regulatory regime.  In mid-
2010, the government finally conducted a public consultation on the proposed 
establishment of an independent Insurance Authority (IIA), an independent statutory 
body which can exercise its power over insurance regulation with more regulatory 
power and financial capacity.   
 
Evaluation of Current Insurance Regulatory Regime 
 
To further evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of the insurance regulatory 
regime in Hong Kong, four generic situations of regulation are examined, including (i) 
regulatory power over the trade, (ii) soft regulation, (iii) institutional design and (iv) 
cross-boundary / global environment.   
 
First, the regulatory power over the trade of insurance products mainly focuses on the 
application of the legislative instruments, which refers to the appropriateness and 
sufficiency of regulatory power over the insurers in the existing system.  Second, the 
soft regulation does not form part of the explicit government regulations, but it has an 
important role for effective regulation and its performance is heavily relied on the 
level of compliance by SROs and other stakeholders.  In the insurance industry, soft 
regulation is in the form of codes of conduct, standards and guidelines for SROs as 
well as agreement, ethics and values complied by the regulatees.  Third, the 
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institutional design of insurance regulator is another important aspect affecting 
whether the regulatory tools function well under the institutional design in balancing 
between integration and autonomy during its application.  Finally, apart from the 
local context, the insurance regulatory regime should be able to maintain its 
efficiency and effectiveness in collaboration with other regulatory regimes in the 
financial sector locally (cross-boundary regulation) and globally given an 
increasingly integrated environment and trend of globalization.  
 
These four aspects are identified as focuses of regulation, as they are the fundamental 
circumstances of regulation and cover particular criteria affecting the use and 
applicability of regulation — internal and external considerations, statutory and soft 
regulation, local and global integration, which are all interrelated with each other in 
terms of regulatory sense.  In applying the seven assessing criteria over the four 
generic situations, some are related to one aspect, while some are related to few of 
them.   
 
Through the four generic lens, inadequacies in the existing insurance regulatory 
regime are detected, including (i) insufficient regulatory power over insurers, (ii) self-
regulatory problems (such as conflict of interest, favourism and lag in monitoring 
over insurance intermediaries), (iii) outdated institutional design and (iv) difficult 
cross-boundary regulation over complicated insurance products in the competitive 
market.  The inadequacies reflect that the current form of regulation over insurance 
industry fails to cater the need in achieving its functions.  The original intent to 
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protect policyholders with a dispersed power between self-regulatory regime and a 
limited power conferred on IA delimit OCI to safeguard the public interest in the 
dynamic and competitive market.  The inadequacies are further elaborated in the 
following sections.   
 
Insufficient Regulatory Power over Insurers  
 
Legitimate power is of utmost importance for a regulator, and regulation over 
insurers mainly covers two broad areas — issuing licences for insurers and 
conducting prudential regulation on insurers’ financial sustainability, such as 
ensuring insurers to meet the minimum paid-up capital and solvency requirements.  
OCI, however, has insufficient regulatory power to discharge its duty.  The ICO has 
become outdated as it was enacted in early 1980s but has not gone through thorough 
amendments or modifications over the years to catch up with the changing market 
environment.  Checking against the seven criteria, this aspect is related to two of 
them — Effectiveness and Due Process. 
 
Effectiveness in Regulating Insurers and Business Conducts  
 
Effectiveness of OCI in regulating insurers is delimited due to insufficient power 
conferred on IA.  The ICO allows IA to authorize insurers to conduct insurance 
business in Hong Kong (by issuing licences) provided that they fulfill the 
requirements at least.  However, IA does not have the power to de-authorize insurers 
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(by withdrawing licences) if they fail to meet the on-going compliance requirements 
or misconduct in running businesses.  IA can only impose interventions, for example, 
to restrict their new businesses of the insurer or require them to maintain a certain 
amount of assets in Hong Kong to protect the interest of policyholders.  Consequently, 
OCI performs as an organization for issuing licences, rather than a regulator 
upholding the quality of service providers in the insurance industry.   
 
On prudential regulation, even if irregularities are detected in the provision of 
services and business conduct, OCI does not have the power to initiate investigation 
or enter the premises of the regulated entities to conduct inspections, nor does it has 
the power to impose supervisory sanctions in the form of public reprimands and fines 
to punish misconduct in the market.  All of such regulatory power is commonly found 
in other financial regulators, and deemed necessary for effective enforcement of 
breaches of financial market regulatory requirements34.  OCI hence heavily relies on 
the self-discipline of insurers as it lacks the power of thorough investigation over 
suspected non-compliance cases. 
 
                                                          
34
  Under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (Financial Institutions) 
Ordinance (Cap. 615) which has become effective since 1 April 2012, all financial regulators 
(including HKMA, SFC, OCI and MPFA) are empowered with full set of regulatory power to 
enforce the statutory anti-money laundering (AML) requirements, such as enter into premises of 
regulated entities to conduct inspections, initiate investigations, make enquiries, access to records 
and documents, apply to Court of First Instance for court orders in the course of inspection and 
investigations, impose supervisory sanctions such as public reprimands and fines, etc.  Such 
regulatory power is on par with the existing regulatory power conferred on HKMA, SFC And 
MPFA and hence not a new thing for these financial regulators.  However, the full set of 
regulatory power is new to OCI that it is the additional power on top of OCI’s power over insurers.  
Though OCI owns the full set of regulatory power under AML Ordinance, it is only available in 
the ambit of AML-related enforcements, and not for the prudential regulation over insurers.   
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Due Process in Financial Sector Regulation  
 
According to Baldwin and Cave (1999, p. 79), due process is significant as “public 
support is merited because the regulator uses procedures that are fair, accessible and 
open”.  The underlying rationale of such a claim is that proper democratic influence 
over regulation is ensured by due process being observed so that this influence has a 
legitimating effect.   
 
However, in the terms of investigation power and punitive measures, regulation by 
OCI is more lenient and lax as compared to other local financial regulators, such as 
SFC and HKMA, which leads to inconsistency in overall regulatory regime in Hong 
Kong.  The SFO and BO confer power of imposition of economic sanctions on SFC 
and HKMA respectively, such as financial penalties against misconduct in the aspects 
of sales and marketing activities, while OCI has no economic sanctions towards 
insurers for non-compliance with requirements under ICO.   
 
On information disclosure, SFC and HKMA protect the general public by 
diminishing asymmetric information in the market.  Financial institutions are required 
to disclose all investment-related information to the public, including investment 
products details, market information, and actions taken in view of the latest 
guidelines and code of conduct applicable to them; while SFC and HKMA disclose 
enforcement and market information to the public regularly, including complaints 
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statistics35 and updated regulatory requirements on enforcement.  On the contrary, 
OCI does not have such mechanism to disclose any information of complaints and 
disciplinary actions taken against insurers.   
 
Fairness must both be done and seen to be done.  All discrepancies of regulatory 
actions, enforcement procedures and complaints handlings contribute an impression 
for the public that regulation by OCI is more lenient than regulation by SFC and 
HKMA.  Also, OCI is comparatively less accessible and open to protect the rights of 
policyholders and ensure stability of the insurance market.  
 
Self-regulation Problems over Insurance Intermediaries 
 
Baldwin and Cave (1999, p. 78) states that “regulatory statutes often give regulators 
scope for exercising judgment and devising solutions…because legislators have 
limited information and expertise in specialist”.  However, the current insurance 
regulatory system lacks a clear scope for execution of judgment due to a fragmented 
distribution of powers.  The regulation of insurance intermediaries is characterized by 
pluralism.  Pursuant to ICO, IA has the legislative mandate to regulate insurers and 
their businesses under the ICO, but he has no direct power to regulate insurance 
intermediaries, in which the regulatory power are scattered over different SROs.  It 
                                                          
35
  In handling of complaints, SFC and HKMA list out the complaints statistics regularly, including 
investigations conducted, actions taken towards the licencees (such as period of licence 
suspension, public reprimand, name of financial institutions or banks, etc.) and some detailed 
information of the cases if necessary. 
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coincides with the definition of pluralism stated by Smith (2006, p. 26) that “the state 
was fragmented into multiple power centres and checkpoints”.  Pluralist advocates 
stress that diversity is deemed as a social good that prevents the dominance of one 
particular idea and power should be dispersed and not allowed to accumulate into the 
state.   
 
The self-regulation problems over insurance intermediaries are related to three 
assessing criteria — Legislative Mandate, Effectiveness and Due Process.   
 
Legislative Mandate for Imposing Legitimate Power for Regulation 
 
Insurance regulation covers mainly two aspects –– prudential regulation of insurers 
and conduct regulation over insurance intermediaries.  Instead of imposing direct 
regulation over insurance intermediaries, OCI depends on SROs to exert a direct 
regulatory power over the intermediaries under the self-regulatory regime.  In fact, 
SROs are industry bodies rather than a regulator.    
 
While there is no explicit wording in the ICO providing legislative mandate on the 
regulation over insurance intermediaries, SROs wholly rely on the Code of Practice 
endorsed by IA to make sure that their members, i.e. insurance intermediaries, 
comply with the Code of Practice.  Added that the institutional set-up of SROs is not 
tailor-made for regulatory function, both the institution and power of SROs lack 
legislative mandate over the regulation of insurance intermediaries.   
- 71 - 
 
Effectiveness in Provision of Services  
 
The original intent of self-regulatory arrangement is to have a dispersed power for 
better use of expertise and knowledge among groups when OCI was established in 
early 1990s.  SROs would be in a better position to grasp the crux of problems as they 
are more familiar with the industry operation as well as to handle and resolve the 
problems swiftly.  Meanwhile, the government would like to establish an 
associational relationship, rather than a command relationship, with SROs at that time.   
 
However, SROs are found to be ineffective in providing the services as reflected in 
some operational problems when the policyholders lodge complaints against 
insurance intermediaries.  The problems exacerbated after the financial crisis in 2008 
with an upsurge of complaints cases.  SROs generally lack the capacity to act, the will 
to act, and the commitment to act appropriately.  The capacity of SROs is unable to 
handle the regulation over insurance intermediaries, as they are industry bodies which 
do not have adequate manpower resources and expertise (given that majority of 
complaints are related to medical claims) to handle the complaints.  Even different 
panels are set up to handle complaints; all panel members are volunteers on part-time 
basis.  Hence it is not uncommon to see the huge amount of complaints backlog 
which might be outstanding for years.   
 
It is not surprising that SROs do not have the will to regulate insurance intermediaries 
and handle complaints effectively.  As SROs are fully financed by insurers and their 
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members (i.e. insurance intermediaries), there is a conflict of interest in the self-
regulatory regime.  The commitment of SROs to regulate appropriately is also 
questionable.  It is difficult to dispel public perception on the bias towards the 
insurance intermediaries because all complaints are processed by panels under SROs 
which are insurance practitioners.  Even the current composition of these panels 
consists of both insurance and independent adjudicators, public still query about the 
impartiality of the panels’ decisions.   
 
Missing Due Process 
 
As the set-up of SROs is for the function of industry bodies, their operational 
procedures are not as formal and well-defined as those of statutory regulators.  It is 
difficult for SROs to perform the role of regulators effectively and efficiently, let 
alone the openness, fairness and accessibility which are the even higher requirements 
for regulators.   
 
Outdated Institutional Design 
 
As part of the government establishment, OCI is the only non-independent financial 
regulator in Hong Kong.  The institutional design is so outdated that this regulatory 
regime can no longer be found in any other developed countries.  Problems as shown 
from three assessing criteria — accountability, autonomy and expertise — are 
attributed to the outdated institutional design. 
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Limited Accountability to the Public   
 
Public governance is accountability, which is a public organization’s obligations “to 
demonstrate that work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules and 
standards or to report fairly and accurately on performance results vis-à-vis mandated 
roles and/or plans” (OECD, 2010).  Baldwin and Cave (1999, p. 287) also stated that 
the utilities regulators should be accountable to the judges, super-agencies, 
monitoring bodies, the government and the parliament, which requires for democratic 
decision-making on social issues.  However, the institutional design of OCI 
(including its extended session of the self-regulatory regime over insurance 
intermediaries) fails to address the accountability demanded by the public or the 
LegCo, but is only accountable to the government.  Such limited accountability 
becomes obsolete that it does not align with the principle of public governance so as 
to ensure a better compliance with agreed rules and standards for the competitive 
markets.  
 
Competitive markets for products and services can be expected to control providers 
and offer a degree of consumer empowerment (Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p. 290).  It 
reflects the demand for consumer protection by the general public.  Accountability is 
crucial in building up the public confidence and enhancing good governance.  
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Limited Autonomy on Policy and Management 
 
Roness et al. (2008, pp. 160-161) identified two kinds of autonomy –– policy 
autonomy and managerial autonomy.  Policy autonomy refers to the degree of 
independence that the organization can choose its policy instruments whereas 
managerial autonomy describes an organization’s choice and use of resources, both 
human and financial resources.  With the presence of autonomy, the public is 
concerned over the control mechanisms and instruments towards the organization 
which reflect the level of protection to consumers and the community as a whole.   
 
OCI operates with a limitation of policy autonomy.  Given regulation inspection and 
supervision over the insurance companies, OCI should have performed effectively 
and kept the stability of insurance sector.  OCI, however, is limited by the existing 
government structure as it is only a government department subsumed under the 
FSTB, which dominates the policy formulation.  OCI becomes a sheer follower of the 
bureau’s direction with limited policy autonomy36.  To worsen the situation, OCI falls 
short of many powerful policy instruments, such as issuing public reprimand, issuing 
fines, withdrawal of insurers’ licenses and is further limited by its status of policy 
autonomy.  
 
                                                          
36
  Other than FSTB’s policy direction, OCI’s decisions may also subject to government officials’ 
direction.  According to sections 2(2) and 11(2) of the ICO, both the Chief Executive of HKSAR 
and Financial Secretary have the power to direct or re-determine the decisions of OCI in some 
cases; though the control mechanism is designed for exceptional circumstances which rarely 
happens, they do affect the policy autonomy of OCI. 
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Regarding managerial decisions, OCI is under a low level of managerial autonomy 
with a high degree of control.  As a part of the government establishment, OCI is 
accountable to the upper level of the hierarchy, including the SFST, the Financial 
Secretary and the Chief Executive and their offices.  They are mainly the managerial 
level of the organization, but rarely other stakeholders, such as policyholders and the 
LegCo.   OCI has to be abided by the statutory scrutiny of its administrative and 
operational procedures by the integrity bodies37, as well as the strict governmental 
regulations and procedures, such as Civil Service Regulations, which is applicable to 
all government departments.  In the same manner, OCI’s financial decisions are also 
strictly monitored by the government as its financial budget as part of FSTB is sought 
from the government budget approved by the LegCo and its expenditure is subject to 
the public audit of the Audit Commission.   
 
Lack of Financial Expertise 
 
Baldwin and Cave (1999, pp. 287-289) states that regulatory statutes often give 
regulators scope for exercising judgment and devising solutions.  As a regulator, OCI 
is obliged to protect the interests of consumers by controlling product standards and 
prices where the market fails to do this.  As strictly bounded by rigid governmental 
rules and procedures, the institutional structure delimits OCI’s efficiency in execution 
of its regulatory power efficiently because it does not incorporate sufficient pool of 
                                                          
37
  Integrity bodies in Hong Kong include the Ombudsman (responsible for handling complaints 
against the maladministration of government departments and public bodies) and Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (responsible for combating corruption).   
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expertise.  Moreover, OCI’s major staff are mostly civil servants that may lack 
market experience and not able to catch up with fast-changing market with numerous 
new products and financial derivatives.  They have to rely on the HKFI or other 
industry bodies for updated market practice and knowledge. 
 
Difficult Cross-Boundary Regulation over Complex Insurance Products  
 
Insurance products develop quickly over time.  A wide range of complex insurance 
products are available for retail customers, for instance the ILAS products.  ILAS 
products comprise both securities and insurance elements issued by insurers, hence 
no longer a pure insurance product under the regulation of OCI and self-regulatory 
regime of SROs.  With the affluence of complex insurance products, the traditional 
boundaries between financial sectors, including securities, banking, insurance and 
pension, become blurred.  Though with insurance element, ILAS products may be 
sold by bank employees, who are regulated by HKMA and the relevant SROs, instead 
of OCI directly.  The financial derivatives with insurance-related products fall beyond 
the scope of OCI to regulate.  
 
Due Process over Cross-boundary Regulation 
 
When there is no longer discrete boundary between securities, banking, insurance and 
pension, the problem for providing fair regulatory procedures arises.  It takes a longer 
time for complainants to lodge the complaints to the responsible regulators because 
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an investment product may be concurrently regulated by two or three regulations, and 
the complexity of products requires specialist and expertise advice for categorization.  
As mentioned earlier, the regulatory power by OCI is less comprehensive compared 
with other regulators and hence regulatory operations are different among different 
regulators (even the regulatory power, statutory requirements and sanctions are the 
same).  Such discrepancies over regulation may lead to unfair competition between 
regulated entities across financial industries and hamper the stability of financial 
system of Hong Kong.  
 
Cross-boundary products also cause the problem of regulatory arbitrage in which 
regulated entities (i.e. insurers and insurance intermediaries) can capitalize on the 
loopholes among different regulatory regimes and circumvent unfavourable 
requirements and disciplinary sanctions, as a result of inconsistent regulation by 
different regulators.   
 
Efficiency for Suitable Level of Regulation 
 
Echoing with the need of due process, a just level of regulation is demanded.  Some 
financial products may be regulated by more than one regulator, while some products 
may fall between the grey areas between regulators without proper regulation.  For 
instance, the equity-linked notes are mainly regulated by SFC with the help of 
HKMA and subject to stringent sales and marketing regulations, while ILAS products 
are fall between the vague regulatory boundaries of SFC, HKMA and OCI that none 
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of the regulator is solely responsible for the regulation.  This leads to the problem of 
over-regulation over some financial products and under-regulation over the others.  
What closely linked with the regulation is the level of available resources.  With 
uneven level of regulation, some specific areas fall short of financial expertise while 
the over-regulated areas have a waste of resources.    
 
Concluding Considerations 
 
In the application of analytical framework, the political stream, being independent of 
other streams, acts as the most important aspect in the three streams model that shows 
the use and applicability of insurance regulatory tools.  In order to evaluate the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of regulatory tools in the insurance industry, four 
generic situations are identified to check against the seven criteria, viz. legitimacy, 
effectiveness, accountability, due process, expertise, efficiency and autonomy.  As 
such, four major areas of regulatory problems are found — insufficient regulatory 
power over insurers, self-regulation problems over insurance intermediaries, outdated 
institutional design and difficult cross-boundary regulation over complex insurance 
products; each of them is related to one or more than one assessing criteria.   
 
The existing insurance regulatory regime is far behind satisfactory.  Starting from the 
regulatory design covering regulation on insurers and the self-regulatory regime of 
insurance intermediaries, and extending from the internal problem of institutional 
design to the external problem of inability to regulate cross-boundary insurance 
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products, the problematic regulations over insurance industry are far more than 
merely the use and applicability of regulatory tools.   
 
With further thoughts, though the improvement of regulatory regime and 
empowerment of OCI by amending the ICO can solve some of the problems (like 
more effective and stringent control over insurance intermediaries by direct 
regulation of OCI), the leverage point of an effective and efficient regulatory regime 
rely on the suitable forms of the  institutions (i.e. OCI).  It would be more appropriate 
for the government to rethink the institutional design of OCI (forms) which is the 
most powerful ‘tool’ to carry out its regulatory function over the insurance industry.   
 
If it is the right direction to go, how many types of forms are available for the future 
OCI?  What is the latest trend of regulatory forms among other overseas financial 
centres?  Which one is the most suitable for the local financial sector and conducive 
for the healthy development of financial market in long term?  The next chapter 
comprises a thorough discussion about forms and functions of OCI.   
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CHAPTER 5: A NEW INSURANCE REGULATORY REGIME: 
ALTERNATIVES & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The previous chapter identified four major problems through an evaluation of the 
performance and effectiveness of insurance regulation by OCI by means of seven 
criteria.  Following the regulatory tools approach, there should be some 
recommendations in the existing insurance regulatory regime by a change of policy 
tools to rectify the problems found in OCI, and achieve a better and more effective 
regulatory regime.  In other words, if OCI is empowered with a new set of enhanced 
policy tools, the problems so identified should be resolved.  The findings of this 
project, however, show that the current situation may not follow this rationale.   
 
While measuring against the appropriateness and effectiveness of various policy tools, 
one should go back to a basic question — what sort of functions are the regulator 
going to perform and could the form adopted by the regulator facilitates the effective 
delivery of its functions? 
 
Assessing Four Possible Alternatives 
 
In this chapter, various insurance regulatory models, both in Hong Kong and overseas, 
are examined.  ‘Function and Form’ is one of the analytical couplets in public 
administration.   The function of a body corporate should dictate the form.  It is found 
that different jurisdictions adopt different regulatory models in regulating the 
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insurance market.  For example, the UK and Singapore have opted for super-regulator 
for years while the US adopts independent regulators for different financial sectors.  
 
In the followings, there is a detailed assessment on four alternatives for setting up a 
new insurance regulatory regime in Hong Kong, which will be systematically 
criticized by seven criteria so as to analyze the pros and cons of each alternative.  The 
four alternatives can be divided into two categories — regulatory tools approach 
(Option 1) and regulatory forms approach (Options 2 to 4):   
 
Option 1: Remaining Status Quo — to Enhance the Regulatory Power of OCI and 
Self-Regulatory Regime of SROs;  
Option 2: Establishing an Independent Regulatory Body — to Establish an IIA as a 
Fully Independent Regulatory Body for Insurance Industry; 
Option 3:  Merging with Another Financial Regulator — to Merge such as HKMA 
or MPFA; and  
Option 4:  Establishing a Super Regulator — to Oversee all Financial Industries as a 
Whole.  
 
Option 1 is the only alternative which examines whether enhancing the regulatory 
power of OCI by altering certain policy tools is a solution in strengthening insurance 
regulation in Hong Kong.  However, it is found that a mere change in the adoption of 
policy tools may not address the problem of insufficient regulation.  The ‘real’ 
problems of insurance regulation (such as those related to limited accountability, 
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limited autonomy and lack of expertise) go beyond the use and applicability of 
regulatory tools, but on the institutional design (i.e. form) of OCI.  As a matter of fact, 
the form which the regulator takes on is of prime importance as it set the framework 
of its function and power.   Drawing reference to overseas experience, different forms 
of insurance regulators are categorized into three major categories, which are 
reflected in Options 2, 3 and 4.  Finally, an overall assessment is made in determining 
which form an insurance regulator in Hong Kong may take on by referencing to some 
overseas models.  
 
Option 1: Remaining Status Quo by Enhancing Regulatory Power of OCI and Self-
Regulatory Regime of SROs 
 
Although it is mentioned before that OCI is an obsolete model based on an outdated 
legislation, sharing power between OCI and SROs is not without merits.  While OCI 
works through the self-regulation of SROs, the advantage of self-regulation is that 
regulators are familiar with industry operation and would be in a better position to 
handle complaints and respond to market situation promptly with professional 
knowledge.  
 
Given the fact that OCI is a government department, the government can exert direct 
control and influence over it particularly on policy directions38.  In addition, as OCI is 
                                                          
38
 While regulators are responsible for frontline regulation of regulated entities, the government 
coordinates the regulatory policies over the whole financial sector, and more importantly, oversees 
whether the regulators are utilizing public resources appropriately and effectively.  There are 
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fully funded by the government, it can have secure funding for the daily operation 
and will not suffer from financial uncertainty since financial stability is also vital for 
the effective day-to-day operation of regulators.  Last but not least, while staff of OCI 
are civil servants, they are bound to be politically neutral in policy formulation. 
 
However, as identified in Chapter 4, there are many inadequacies on the insurance 
regulation, including the regulatory problems over the regulation of both insurers and 
insurance intermediaries.  OCI does not have full set of regulatory power to oversee 
the financial conditions of insurers, while the nature of SROs as industry bodies fully 
financed by the insurers, so that there is potential conflict of interest and SROs tend 
to adopt a more lax attitude in handling complaints against the industry.  These 
problems are related to the legitimacy of OCI’s regulatory power, which originates 
from the obsolete legislation (i.e. ICO).   
 
To tackle the existing regulatory problems, the government can improve the 
regulatory tools of OCI so that some areas of regulation could be enhanced, such as 
legitimacy, due process and efficiency.  In order to enhance the legitimacy and power 
of OCI as the regulator for insurance industry, one of the possible alternatives is to 
strengthen its regulator power as well as its status rested with SROs.  For instance, 
the government can revise the outdated ICO and confer full set of regulatory power 
                                                                                                                                                                     
overseas  examples showing that independent regulators may develop as an ‘independent 
kingdom’ and out of government’s control which might not regulate the industry effectively and 
promote the financial stability of its country.  For details, please see the example of FSA in Option 
4 below.   
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on OCI particularly over the aspects of enquiry, investigation and sanction.  At the 
same time, the revised ICO can stipulate OCI’s legitimate control on SROs in the 
supervision of insurance intermediaries explicitly39, and widen representation in view 
of the composition of the committees of SROs to include more varieties of 
independent members such as academia and representatives from the Consumer 
Council to impose a better check and balance mechanism to deal with various 
complaints. 
 
The enhancement of OCI’s regulatory power and self-regulatory regime of SROs, 
however, can only solve small part of the operational inadequacies of OCI and SROs.  
Even if the legitimacy and regulatory power of OCI are enhanced, majority of the 
critical criteria of an effective and efficient financial regulator — autonomy, 
accountability and expertise  — still could not be attained.   
 
As OCI is a still government department where its resources are highly depends on 
the public resources, which affects its public image and investigation work.  Public 
perception on its autonomy and accountability are limited as being an insurance 
regulator.  OCI can only perform as machinery for policy implementation, merely to 
ensure achievement and compliance with the stipulated objectives in the ICO.  
Nevertheless, it lacks the avenue for policy formulation and policy evaluation.  
                                                          
39
  The current ICO does not explicitly stipulate the regulatory power arrangement between the IA 
(i.e. OCI) and SROs or OCI’s role in the regulation over insurance intermediaries.  Pursuant to 
sections 67 and 70 of ICO, the government only requires the SROs to issue Code of Conduct for 
the administration of insurance agents and sets the minimum requirements for insurance brokers.  
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Nevertheless, OCI is not accountable to either the public or the LegCo as being a 
publicly-financed regulator.  The inability to change its level of accountability fails to 
meet public expectation and fulfill good public governance.   
 
Similarly, problems of openness, transparency and expertise will not be solved due to 
the governmental nature of OCI which are required to follow rigid rules and 
regulations.   OCI will not be able to recruit the market talents who are in touch with 
the latest changes of financial market, nor can it deploy its resources in a flexible way, 
such as enlisting more professionals to cope with sudden increase of complaints and 
workload after the financial crisis.  OCI’s ability to regulate cross-boundary complex 
insurance products will not be altered significantly, given that its investigation and 
prosecution procedures are not on par with those of other independent financial 
regulators, like SFC, HKMA and MPFA.   
 
Figure 5 summarizes the impact on OCI with a change of policy tools. 
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Figure 5: Summary of Impacts on OCI with Changes of Policy Tools 
 
Area To Be 
Addressed 
Possible Changes of Policy Tools Possible Impacts Of Changes  
Legitimacy  To give full set of regulatory power, including investigative and sanction power 
 To revise the outdated piece of legislation May be improved 
Due process 
 To strengthen the regulator power of OCI and its status rested with SROs 
 To enhance transparency by information disclosure 
 To co-ordinate with other financial regulators to ensure fair regulatory procedures 
and avoid overlapping in regulatory effort 
May be improved 
Expertise   Governmental nature comprising mainly civil servants 
 Lack of professional support Unlikely to be improved 
Efficiency   To set up a platform for collaboration with other financial regulators such as SFC, HKMA and MPFA to reduce regulatory arbitrage May be improved 
Effectiveness  To exercise more effective and stringent control over insurance intermediaries by direct regulation of OCI May be improved 
Accountability  To widen representation in view of the composition of the committees of SROs 
 
Slightly improved 
Autonomy  Restricted by the form of being a government department 
 
Unlikely to be improved 
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As a follow-up on the regulatory tools approach, Option 1 proposes many changes on the 
tools of OCI in the hope of improving the existing regulatory problems.  As many of the 
regulatory inadequacies are closely linked to the forms, rather than the functions of OCI; 
the crux of regulatory problems falls on the change of forms of OCI.  In short, the 
adoption of enhanced policy tools could not rectify all the problems that OCI are facing, 
such as the issue of accountability, autonomy and expertise.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine a broader approach in searching for better alternatives for the future insurance 
regulatory regime in Hong Kong.  Options 2, 3 and 4 are all in the form of independent 
regulators, but in different modes addressing different aspects of regulation in the market.  
Analysis is done on the preferred mode which is more appropriate for the Hong Kong 
context (i.e. fit for purpose).  
 
Option 2: Establishing an Independent Regulatory Body for Insurance Industry 
 
As OCI takes up the legitimate role or function of regulator for insurance industry, it is 
opined that OCI should be independent from the government structure and transform into 
a statutory body in order to discharge its statutory functions with legal validity. 
 
The proposal on the establishment of an independent insurance regulator (i.e. IIA) has 
long been an item in the government agenda, which first appeared in the Policy Address 
1996.  Yet, the proposal remained stagnant for many years as there were fierce 
oppositions from the industry practitioners and the government could not reach a 
consensus on whether to set up a ‘super-regulator’ to regulate and supervise all financial 
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services providers, akin to the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)40 in Singapore; or 
to establish an IIA in parallel with other financial regulators which regulate different 
sectors of the financial market, akin to the practice in China41.   
 
With such a paradigm shift into an independent regulator, IIA will turn into a highly 
integrated model, taking up all the tasks from policy formulation, policy implementation 
to policy evaluation.  These three tasks require high degree of co-ordination and design 
tools, action tools and review tools which need to be devised cautiously and prudently 
with lots of expertise.  
 
From the macro view over the whole financial sector, with the proposed establishment of 
IIA, the government now adopts the idea of pluralism in the regulation of financial 
providers, of which different powers are vested in different financial regulators over a 
specific area.  Unlike OCI which is adopting a hybrid of the concepts of the Old Public 
Administration that concerns over putting and maintaining the system in place, and the 
New Public Management that emphasizes on outputs and efficiency, IIA is adopting the 
ideas of  New Public Administration (NPA) that focuses on values include equity, 
participation, justice and responsiveness.  
 
                                                          
40
  MAS is an independent regulator which regulates the whole financial services industry, including 
banking, securities and insurance, in Singapore.  There is no independent regulator for pension industry 
in Singapore because the Central Provident Fund (compulsory comprehensive savings plan for 
retirement, healthcare, and housing needs) is administered by the Singaporean government.  
41
   The different financial industries in China are regulated by independent regulators, including China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission.   
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Another advantage of the proposed IIA is that it will have its governing board and 
standing committees which consist of representatives from different interested parties and 
will directly “provide leadership and direction and … guide the IIA in development of a 
corporate strategy”, which can guarantee a higher degree of accountability (FSTB, 2011, 
p. 13).  In other words, IIA can enjoy a high level of operational and financial autonomy 
as well as be more accountable to its stakeholders.    
 
At present, OCI oversees the intermediaries via SROs indirectly and public doubt 
whether self-regulatory bodies sponsored or supported by industry members would play 
an effective role in monitoring members’ compliance.  With the direct control and 
monitoring of intermediaries by IIA, the regulation over insurance intermediaries will be 
more stringent and systemic than the current regulation.  This can increase the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of regulation over intermediaries.  However, such a rapid 
and sudden change of regulatory mode inevitably leads to more confrontation with those 
intermediaries which both the government and IIA should take extra care42. 
 
As the objectives in setting up an IIA include (i) enhancing protection of policyholders, 
(ii) maintaining public confidence in insurance market, (iii) contributing to the financial 
stability and (iv) reducing market misconduct, it is able to attain higher flexibility in 
dynamic financial environment and has on par status with other financial regulators to 
                                                          
42
   In the latest public consultation on the key legislative proposals on the IIA conducted by FSTB in early 
2013, many oppositions against IIA’s direct regulation over insurance intermediaries were received.  
Though the proposed regime is comparable to the existing regulatory regime for intermediaries 
regulated by SFC and MPFA, both SROs and their members (i.e. intermediaries) greatly objected the 
proposed legislation and worried about the stringent regulation over them and the wide range of 
disciplinary sanctions to be imposed on them by IIA. (FSTB, 2013) 
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facilitate negotiation and collaboration, which helps IIA having more effective and 
transparent regulation than the current OCI.   
 
In promoting open and inclusive policy making, representatives from outside parties into 
the governing board of IIA are crucial.  There might be skepticism among the industry 
practitioners that the composition of future members will affect the technicality of the 
professional operation resulting in concerns of having non-professionals regulating the 
professionals.  Also, as IIA is obligated to foster better cooperation on market 
development and enhance civic engagement in policy initiatives, there is worry over the 
diversified perspectives or views may lead to disharmony in the insurance industry due to 
increasing expectation from the public.  
 
However, in view of cross-boundary selling, setting up independent regulators for 
different financial industries may not fully resolve the issue of regulatory arbitrage and 
overlapping regulatory effort.  In the proposed establishment of IIA, it is proposed that 
HKMA will be vested with powers similar to IIA for HKMA to regulate bank staff 
selling insurance products, such that both HKMA and IIA will regulate different 
intermediaries under different circumstances.  Caution should be taken to avoid any 
overlap in regulatory efforts resulting in increased supervisory costs.  Regulatory gaps 
may still exist as a result of ambiguity in respective roles and responsibilities of different 
regulators.  It is vital to set out framework for mutual assistance and information 
exchange to facilitate effective discharge of their respective regulatory duties.  Likewise, 
inconsistency in regulation can lead to regulatory arbitrage to the detriment of consumer 
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interests, whereby insurers or insurance intermediaries could capitalize on loopholes in 
the regulatory system in order to circumvent unfavorable regulation and disciplinary 
sanction. 
 
Option 3: Merging with Another Financial Regulator such as HKMA / MPFA 
 
Another alternative for insurance regulation in Hong Kong is to merge OCI with another 
financial regulator, such as HKMA or MPFA.  The merged regulator is more possible 
with HKMA or MPFA because insurance intermediaries are usually regulated by OCI, 
HKMA and MPFA concurrently where cross-boundary nature of insurance products 
going into banking and pension area.   
 
The pioneer of merged regulator can be found in US.  If one examines the US model, it is 
noticed that the insurance industry in the US is regulated by the individual state 
governments separately, which is known as state-based insurance regulation system.  
Under such regulatory structure, each state regulator regulates its own insurance market 
independently.  The Federal Insurance Office43  is part of the federal government to 
coordinate and develop federal policy on regulatory issues and monitor the insurance 
industry in a macro level, but it is neither a regulator nor a supervisor.  There are some 
other common platforms for the discussion of insurance model laws and regulation, like 
                                                          
43
   Federal Insurance Office was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act after the global financial crisis in 2008.  It is authorized to monitor the insurance 
industry and look for any loopholes in the current state-based regulatory system.  Together with 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (which was also established by the above Reform), they are both 
responsible for identifying the risks detrimental to financial stability, including insurance market.    
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National Association of Insurance Commissioners 44 , providing some degree of 
uniformity between states, but these models are not effective unless they are adopted by 
individual state regulators.  
 
The financial sector regulation model in New York is chosen for illustration as an 
example because it is an international financial centre comparable to Hong Kong.  
Following a serious of financial regulation reforms after the global financial crisis in 
2008, one of the changes is the creation of the New York State Department of Financial 
Services (DFS)45.  DFS is the consolidation of functions of the New York State Banking 
Department and the New York State Insurance Department, which were former state 
agencies regulating and supervising banking and insurance businesses respectively.  
These former state agencies have limited regulation because they only focused on certain 
types of regulated institutions.  The state government believes that the merged agency, 
DFS, can modernize the regulation over regulated entities by overseeing a broader array 
of financial services and products, so that it can have a macro view on regulated 
institutions.  The merit of this model of merged regulator is that it follows international 
indicator in measuring regulatory efficacy.  It can also possess regulatory expertise. 
                                                          
44
  The National Association of Insurance commissioners is the standard-setting and regulatory support 
organization created and governed by the chief insurance regulators from 50 states.  State insurance 
regulators establish standards or best industry practice, conduct peer review and coordinate regulatory 
oversight in US.   
45
   DFS, established in October 2011, aims to keep pace with the rapid and dynamic evolution of these 
industries, to guard against financial crises and to protect customers and market from fraud.  DFS 
directly regulates institutions related to banking and insurance businesses.  It also supervises the 
financial products and services, including those subject to the provision of the Insurance Law and the 
Banking Law, investigates real estates and homeowner issues and monitors the capital markets like 
state and municipal retirement plans.  
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DFS comprises a banking division and an insurance division.  The former supervises, 
through chartering, licensing, registering, and examining safety and soundness, among 
other actions, nearly 1,900 banking and other financial institutions while the latter 
supervises all insurance companies (around 1,700 insurers) that do business in New York.  
They have clearly defined and shared responsibilities.  It helps reducing certain degree of 
regulatory arbitrage as compared with individual independent regulators.  
 
However, as banking and insurance regulation come under two divisions, arbitrage might 
still exist.  Internally, they might also compete for resources particularly when there is 
outcry of crisis where prompt action and risk management is imminent.  As the merged 
regulator has only been operating for less than two years during which no financial crisis 
occurs, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of this new model or 
assess its responsiveness to any regulatory failure.   
 
Option 4: Establishing a Super-Regulator Overseeing All Financial Industries as a 
Whole 
 
Other than independent financial regulators, super-regulator is a regulatory model 
commonly found in many countries, including Singapore, Japan, France and Germany.   
Though their regulatory structures may vary from each other, these regulators are usually 
responsible for all financial activities in the market, including prudential regulation and 
conduct supervision of regulated entities.   
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In Singapore, MAS46 takes on the form of a super-regulator which oversees financial 
services industry including banking, securities, insurance and pension.  Other than acting 
as the central bank of Singapore to manage the official foreign reserves, it also conducts 
integrated supervision of financial services and financial stability surveillance.  MAS can 
specify whether a contravention of a direction is a criminal offence.  It can also issue 
guidelines, codes, practice notes and circular.   
 
Besides the Singapore’s model, the former Financial Services Authority (FSA)47 of the 
UK was also a demonstration of the super-regulator model.  FSA was responsible for the 
regulation of the financial services industry in the UK between 2001 and 2013.  It 
operated independently of government and was funded entirely by the firms it regulated 
through fines, fees and compulsory levies.  FSA was responsible for the overall scope of 
regulatory activities and power, regulating over 29,000 firms in the financial sector.    
                                                          
46
 MAS was established in 1971 to provide for the exercise of control over and the resolution of financial 
institutions and their related entities by the MAS and other authorities, and to establish a framework for 
the issue of securities by the MAS and the regulation of primary dealers of such securities.  It regulates 
commercial banks, merchant banks, finance companies, insurance, securities, futures and fund 
management, financial adviser, money brokers, money-changing and remittance businesses, business 
trusts, trusts companies, payment and settlement systems.  MAS also act as the central bank of 
Singapore, including the conduct of monetary policy, the issuance of currency, the oversight of 
payment systems and serving as banker and financial agent of the government.  
47
  Established in 2001, FSA was responsible for the regulation of all financial industries in UK.  Other 
than its core work on the regulation of financial institutions, FSA emphasized on the providing an 
effective retail market for financial products and protecting retail consumers to get fair deal, so as to 
raise the confidence and capability of consumers and market.  Objectives of the FSA were to (i) 
maintain confidence in the financial system (market confidence); (ii) contribute to the protection and 
enhancement of stability of the UK financial system (financial stability); (iii) secure the appropriate 
degree of protection for consumers (consumer protection); and (iv) reduce the extent to which it is 
possible for a business carried on by a regulated person to be used for a purpose connected with 
financial crime (reduction of financial crime).  
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However, the super-regulator model faced many challenges and criticisms in dealing with 
the changing environment and increasing public expectation, and it is evolving too. 
 
As a risk-based regulator, FSA spent more time to oversee those institutions deemed to 
pose the biggest risk.  However, the collapse of Northern Rock Bank in early 2008 
revealed many weakness and loopholes of the regulation by FSA.  Though there were 
many early warning signs suggesting the weaknesses of the Northern Rock, FSA failed to 
actively seek further information and notice the serious capital shortfall of the bank for 
proper regulatory action.  Finally, Northern Rock was nationalized with £100 billion 
liabilities taken on the UK government’s books (Seib, 2008).  The failure of FSA was not 
only on its regulation, but also its nature of ‘independent kingdom’ which was out of 
government’s control.  As FSA operated like a private company, its high turnover rate 
had led to inconsistent regulation, where the responsible head for regulating the Bank has 
changed thrice in 2.5 years.  While there were wide criticisms on effectiveness of the 
regulation by FSA, its staff still received bonuses of around £20 million (a 40% increase 
on the previous year) one month after the bail-out of Northern Rock Bank (Watts, 2009).  
 
In face of the public outcry on the performance of FSA in the regulation of financial 
sector, the UK government decided to restructure financial sector regulation and 
abolished the FSA on 1 April 2013.  Its responsibilities were then split between two new 
agencies, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) and PRA is responsible for the prudential regulation of financial firms, 
- 96 - 
 
such as banks, building societies and insurers, while FCA promotes the policies related to 
financial activities and business conduct of financial system.  In addition, a Financial 
Policy Committee is also set up under the Bank of England which acts for the overall 
financial stability in the UK.   
 
Overall Analysis of the Four Alternatives 
 
To analyze the four alternatives and compare them with each other, five parameters 
acting as important indicators contributing to an effective and efficient financial regulator 
are identified, namely, (i) Degree of Command and Control, (ii) Degree of Autonomy, (iii) 
Degree of Equity, (iv) Level of Accountability and (v) Level of Transparency.     
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Four Alternatives by Five Parameters 
 
In Figure 6, it is observed that OCI is relatively low in various parameters and the super-
regulator is very high on the other side of the spectrum.  However, there is an idiom ‘too 
far is as bad as not enough’.  While measuring the performance against all the above-
 OCI IIA Merged Regulator 
Super-
Regulator 
Degree of Command and 
Control Low High High Very High 
Degree of Autonomy Low Medium High Very High 
Degree of Equity Low Medium High High 
Level of Accountability Low High High High 
Level of Transparency Low High High High 
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mentioned parameters, the highest attainment of them may not always be desirable.  For 
instance, while some scholars advocate the concept of “steering rather than rowing” 
(Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003, p. 14), is it really the best option for the regulator to 
exercise full command and control?   In addition, there are many questions subject to 
public debate and consideration as follows:   
 
 Given such a scope and power, will a super-regulator become complacent and lead 
to empire building which goes beyond government control and public scrutiny?  
Will it then do something that contravene to the public policy and government 
directives in view of public interest?  
 
 As for the issue of transparency, people usually consider some information may be 
commercially sensitive in nature.  What sort of information is required to be 
protected against disclosure to regulators?  How far should information of regulation 
be appropriately and necessarily released to the public in view of transparency?  
Will there be leakage of pre-mature information or confused information which may 
affect the operation of normal financial market adversely?  
 
 How to justify a balance between regulation and public interest considerations to 
make such information available?  Certain information may affect the confidence in 
financial market and institution, and thus affect financial stability.  Should it be kept 
confidential or be released immediately under an overriding public interest?  In 
balancing interest of various parties and attaining equity, will there be issue of moral 
- 98 - 
 
hazard among market participants?  In view of conflicting views in policy issues, 
should the regulator be accountable to the legislature, government, public or 
investors with vested interests?  For sure, it is not uncommon to see opposing 
agenda from various stakeholders, including the government, the LegCo and the 
general public over the same regulatory issue. 
 
Recommendation 
 
Having examined the above four options, it is found that the most appropriate option for 
insurance regulation in Hong Kong would be the setting up of IIA, taking into account 
the political, compliance and resources considerations.  Given the pros and cons of 
various alternatives and the overseas models, it is difficult to have a universal perfect 
model across the territory given the diversity in political, social, economic and cultural 
background.  While referencing on the overseas experiences, certain constraints are 
detected and whether the recommended option could sustain depends much on its 
receptiveness in the local context.  Therefore, the government must proceed prudently 
and cautiously with the proposed establishment of IIA which is deemed as a critical 
change in regulatory form. 
 
Political Considerations 
 
A critical factor that leads to the success of policy formulation and decision is the 
balancing the interest and influence of various policy actors that involve lots of 
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negotiations, compromises and trade-offs.  According to Kingdon (1995, p. 145) “the 
political stream flows along independently of the problems and policy streams, which is 
composed of public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or 
ideological distribution in Congress, and changes of administration.” 
 
When deciding on a most appropriate alternative for the regulation of insurance industry 
in Hong Kong, the power struggle of policy actors should be tactfully managed in order 
to ensure policy support and compliance at the implementation stage.  
 
There are three main categories of policy actors in the pursuit of establishing IIA, namely 
the government as the policy initiator, mainly senior government officials in FSTB, the 
supportive side (including the non-governmental organizations like the Consumer 
Council and various political parties) and the opposing side (including the SROs, 
intermediaries, insurance agents and related bodies).  While the government proposes IIA 
as the future regulatory framework for insurance industry, different policy actors have 
struggled to exert influence on the proposal by different strategies to alter the societal 
pulse in support for their own stances, which rendered a crowding political environment.  
The greatest opposition comes from the industry practitioners lest the tightening of 
control and regulation would make life and business difficult for them.  
 
It is highly predictable that if the government goes for the third and fourth alternatives in 
advocating the merging with other existing financial regulators or setting up a super-
regulator, it will face much greater opposition and resistant not only the insurance 
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industry, but also the banking and securities ones.  The respective regulatory systems of 
SFC, HKMA and MPFA are all well established and have been performing satisfactorily 
over the years, a tremendous reform and a revolutionary change might affect the financial 
stability and sustainability which are the prime concern of Hong Kong as a regional 
financial hub.  Being an important policy entrepreneur, the government will need to take 
a longer time to capture the market sentiment, gauge support as well as to lobby those 
opposition forces.  With such a drastic change on the financial regulation and the current 
political environment, the government may suffer from a major setback and the policy 
window may lapse again. 
 
Instead of pushing forward the proposal of a super-regulator which might cause a high 
degree of uncertainty and hindrance, the imminent policy goal of the government might 
focus on combating undesirable market conduct instead of which regulatory regime to 
depend on.  Again, it is the analytical couplet of ‘form follows function’. 
 
The reality of the situation is that there is no perfect regulatory regime that fits all.  In 
considering an appropriate model that fit for purpose, the model must cater for the unique 
environment and market in Hong Kong.  The proposed establishment of IIA might not be 
an ideal alternative but it is undoubtedly a compromise among policy actors.  Albeit all 
these, the establishment of IIA is at least a leap forward in rationalizing and strengthening 
the regulation of insurance industry given the political constraint.  
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Compliance Considerations 
 
Another important aspect of contemplation is the barriers to compliance and 
implementation in view of the diversity of policy actors and political environment.  
Weaver (2013, p. 8) highlighted that any non-compliance with a public policy would 
come from complex roots, rather than any specific barriers for any separate individual 
target populations.  Actually, there are relationships and interactions among different 
barriers and targets, such as multiple barriers for individual targets, target heterogeneity, 
multiple targets, and complex and on-going compliance. 
 
For the regulation of insurance industry, there are so many stakeholders involved whom 
interact with each other.  In the proposal of IIA establishment, Figure 7 shows that the 
multiple players include not only the insurance industry practitioners, but also the 
counterparts in other financial sectors such as banking and securities, and the general 
public as a vast majority of them are policyholders.  The multi-dimensional relationship 
illustrates that compliance issues are more than ordinary regulatory work between IIA 
and industry practitioners, but also rely on the support of the public, good coordination 
work with other regulators and overall financial policy direction by the government. 
 
Similarly, there are barriers to compliant behaviour in setting up a super-regulator such as 
monitoring and enforcement barriers, as well as capacity barriers which include the issues 
of resources and autonomy.  The operations of different financial industries are distinct 
from each other that the regulatory guidelines cannot be aligned in details, such as the 
- 102 - 
 
exact amount of capital ratio and liquidity.  Rather, performance-based or risk-based 
regulations prevail in a merged- or super-regulator that may render an increasing 
tendency to non-compliance.  
 
The government as a policy entrepreneur has to examine all potential barriers for policy 
implementation in order to secure successful implementation of the new regulatory 
regime in the finance sector.  The considerations include whether the government could 
rally support from stakeholders and garner co-ordinated efforts from various financial 
industries, whether the scope is manageable given the large numbers of practitioners and 
the scope of services rendered and how to secure a high level of conformity. 
 
Figure 7:  Multi-Dimensional Relationship between IIA and Different Key Stakeholders 
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Resources Considerations 
 
Availability and exigency of resources is also a crucial factor for consideration.  A 
separate independent entity, IIA, would be a better solution which could focus more on 
that specific sector and thus understand the need of the stakeholders.  This is because 
regulation of insurance industry requires expertise and technical knowledge given its 
large scope with large number of practitioners (i.e. over 160 insurance companies and 
68,000 insurance intermediaries).  Existing resources in terms of regulatory system and 
professional staff can be retained, so that there will be a smoother transition of the 
regulatory work from the current OCI to the newly established IIA in future.  
 
A merged- or super-regulator is less desirable in terms of resources.  Merging of different 
regulators requires a fundamental change of the regulatory concept and relevant 
ordinances where traditional boundaries of financial industries may no longer exist.  
Different regulatory work under a merged- or super-regulator is usually divided by the 
functions of regulation, including the prudential regulation and market conduct of market 
participants, which are usually further divided by the size of regulated entities, consumer 
protection, market stability, etc.  It will take a longer time to revise the existing regulatory 
regime in banking, securities and pension industries and provide extra training for 
enhancing professional knowledge of existing staff so that they will become generalists in 
financial regulation.  The lengthy process might not be able to cope with the imminent 
need at present to enhance consumer protection and strengthen control over risk and crisis 
management of the insurance industry. 
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The establishment of IIA is not affecting the existing regime too much, which incur less 
barriers for compliance and easier to get compromise among various policy actors.  
Furthermore, relatively lesser resources will be required than setting up a super-regulator.  
On one hand there will be more regulatory control on insurers and intermediaries.  On the 
other, its independent status with a representative governing board can enhance 
protection of policyholders and assume greater flexibility in risk management.  It is also 
hoped that IIA can gain greater public confidence and increase competitiveness on 
innovative policies as IIA has to compare its effectiveness, efficiency and equity with the 
other regulators.  However, there must be an inter-industry platform to strengthen 
communication and collaboration of various financial regulators to avoid over- or under-
regulatory effort. 
 
To conclude, after examining various alternatives, it is found that the proposed 
establishment of IIA with power and status on par with other financial regulators in Hong 
Kong is highly supported, which could fit the situation of Hong Kong most.  Nevertheless, 
a periodic review system should be implemented in view of the changing socio-economic 
and political environment, both locally and globally, in order to keep pace of the latest 
global financial development. 
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A Snapshot of Latest Development 
 
As for the latest development, it is observed that another innovative alternative, i.e. the 
twin-peak regulatory regime, may be treated as a transformed model of super-regulator. 
 
The distinctive feature of this twin-peak model is that it has the concept of super-
regulator in mind that oversees banking, insurance, securities and pension as a whole, but 
the regulatory framework is divided by means of functionalities, i.e. prudential regulation 
and market conduct.  Examples of such new model include the current financial regulator 
PRA and FCA in the UK; and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) in Australia.  The 
separation of functionality can streamline the investigation and supervision operations 
over financial institutions by focusing on two most important aspects of regulation –– 
prudential regulation and market conduct monitoring.  Prudential regulation focuses on 
stability, sustainability and vitality to ensures financial soundness or regulated entities 
and do not affect the stability of whole financial system.  At the same time, market 
conduct monitoring pays specific attention to safeguarding integrity, equity, enhancing 
market transparency and consumer protection by eliminating unacceptable market 
practices and ensuring suitability of financial products for customers. 
 
As mentioned above, the UK abolished the super-regulator model and set up two new 
authorities, PRA and FCA, to replace FSA in April 2013.  PRA is responsible for the 
prudential regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers 
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and major investment firms, and in total it regulates around 1,700 financial firms.  PRA 
works alongside FCA creating a ‘twin peaks’ regulatory structure in the UK.  FCA is 
responsible for promoting effective market competition and for the conduct regulation of 
all financial services firms.  It also aims to prevent market abuse and ensuring that 
consumers get a fair deal from financial firms.  Moreover, FCA operated the prudential 
regulation of those financial services firms not supervised by PRA, such as asset 
managers and independent financial advisers.  
 
Australia is also adopting this twin peak regulatory regime by splitting largely on the 
functionalities as prudential regulation and market conduct to be overseen by APRA and 
ASIC respectively.  
 
The Australian Government established APRA for prudential regulation of insurance 
companies and ASIC for the conduct of intermediaries.  Banks, building societies, credit 
unions, life and general insurance companies and most of the superannuation industry are 
supervised by APRA.  APRA continuously oversees the activities of the financial 
institutions to ensure that they comply with prudential standards, are in sound financial 
condition and have adequate and effective governance and risk management systems with 
an aim to promoting stability and confidence in the Australian financial system.  APRA is 
funded largely by the industries that it supervises and all levies collected are used for 
supervision of the financial industry. 
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Figure 8: An Innovative Alternative: Twin-Peak Regulatory Regime in Overseeing 
Financial Sector 
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Concluding Comments 
 
In this chapter, four possible alternatives in enhancing insurance regulation in Hong Kong 
have been examined.  It is realized that a change in regulatory form could be a better 
solution than a reactive problem-fixing approach by improving certain policy tools.  
 
In comparing the three regulatory form (i.e. Options 2 to 4), it is noticed that the degree 
of command and control, degree of autonomy, degree of equity, level of accountability 
and level of transparency vary.  Besides analyzing the aforesaid parameters, the 
government must also cogitate the political, resources and compliance issues before 
putting forward a new piece of legislation.  Having considered all constraints in the local 
context, it is believed that setting up an IIA (i.e. Option 2) is more appropriate at the 
present political, economic, and social environment in Hong Kong.  
 
With such evolutionary approach, it is hoped that the insurance regulation in Hong Kong 
can be strengthened, with greater focus on integrity, equity and market transparency, 
which is a prime concern after the breakout of financial crisis in 2008.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
As one of the major pillar in the Hong Kong economy, the financial sector performs a 
vital role to its economy.  Notwithstanding Hong Kong is recognized as one of the 
international financial centre with a leading financial market in the region, it is surprising 
that our insurance regulatory regime is far lagged behind the need of market advancement 
and international regulatory standard.  The Lehman Brothers mini-bond incident raised 
public awareness of the effectiveness of the financial regulatory system and the level of 
consumer protection provided by financial regulators.  The incident also acted as the 
focusing event to open a policy window for the review of insurance regulatory regime 
which has remained stagnant for more than a decade due to divided opinions and 
oppositions from industry practitioners.   
 
Summary of the Project and its Findings 
 
To improve the existing regulatory regime and enhance consumer protection, this project 
examines a range of regulatory tools and explores a number of better alternatives for the 
insurance regulation.  The following questions are studied:  
 
 What types of regulatory tools can a government adopt to oversee and control the 
financial sector, including the insurance industry?   
 What particular regulatory tools has the Hong Kong government actually adopted to 
oversee and control the insurance industry? 
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 According to what criteria can the appropriateness and effectiveness of the possible 
array of regulatory tools be evaluated? 
 What other regulatory tools could be adopted by the Hong Kong government to 
more effectively oversee and control the insurance industry? 
 
Kingdon’s (1995) three streams model enlightens the project with three fundamental 
elements of the financial sector regulation, including why, how and how effective of 
regulation or regulatory tools.  The problems, policy and political streams set the major 
dimensions of government agenda setting, and align with three elements of regulation — 
why, how and how effective respectively.  With the coupling of three elements in 
insurance regulation, added with the Lehman Brothers mini-bond incident as the focusing 
event, there appears a policy window for the government to reactivate the discussion on 
the insurance regulatory regime.   
 
The reasons for government regulation of the financial market are examined in view of 
market failure, public interest protection, risk management and trust building.  In carrying 
out the regulation, five broad forms of regulatory tools are available for the government 
to regulate the financial sector, namely command and control tools, economic tools, 
transactional tools, structural tools and information tools.  A mix of tools is adopted by 
OCI in the regulation of insurance industry, but of different extent and degree compared 
with SFC, HKMA and MPFA, mainly due to the constraints of the ICO and its 
institutional design.   
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The appropriateness and effectiveness of current regulatory tools are evaluated by seven 
criteria, namely legitimacy, effectiveness, accountability, due process, expertise, 
efficiency and autonomy.  Checking against the criteria, four core regulatory problems 
are reflected in the current insurance regulatory regime.  The fundamental problem is that 
OCI generally lacks insufficient regulatory power under the ICO, and hence it has 
insufficient power to regulate both insurers and insurance intermediaries.  Following the 
institutional structure of OCI as part of the government, it has very limited autonomy and 
accountability which cannot meet the basic requirements in the demand of public 
governance.  Regulatory ineffectiveness of OCI also spillovers to other financial 
regulators like SFC and HKMA that many cross-boundary regulatory problems arise 
where regulated entities can easily manipulate the loopholes by regulatory arbitrage.   
 
To explore possible alternatives for improving the insurance regulatory regime, the 
possibility and effectiveness of changing the existing regulatory tools are analyzed.  
However, it is found that the regulatory problems in insurance industry go beyond the 
tools level.  The leverage point of an appropriate and effective regime depends on the 
forms of regulation which follows the functions of regulator.  Having studied a number of 
overseas models of insurance regulators and having considered the political, compliance 
and resource aspects, it seems that the establishment of an IIA is the most appropriate and 
feasible way to start with and to deal with the opposing parties.   
 
However, there is no single perfect tool in the world which solves all regulatory problems.  
In face of the rapidly changing environment, many overseas regulators have undergone 
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review or reform in search for a better form to regulate market players and protect 
individual consumers.  In short, there is no stop for an appropriate and effective 
regulatory regime which should keep track of market pace and development all the time.   
 
Heading to the Era of Integrity 
 
To maintain Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre and promote the 
development of financial market, the Hong Kong government finally has made its effort 
in striving towards the era of integrity as advocated in the NPA.  With the opening of a 
policy window, the government launched two public consultations on the broad 
framework and detailed proposals for the establishment of IIA in 2010 and 2011 
respectively, and the key legislative proposals are concluded in June 2013 following a 
public consultation in late 2012.  This illustrates that the government would like to move 
OCI from the concept of the Old Public Administration which only interested in 
maintaining the current system in place to the era of integrity under NPA where outputs 
and efficiency are emphasized, focusing on values of equity, participation, justice and 
responsiveness.   
 
Final Thoughts 
 
Another analytical couplet in public administration — bits and wholes — should not be 
neglected.  Though the focus of this project is on the regulation of insurance industry 
which is a necessity for the promotion of insurance market development in long term, one 
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should not overlook the importance of stability of the whole financial sector which 
provides the basis for the market development.   
 
In the local perspective, the Hong Kong government strives to balance the interests and 
achieve stability in every single industry in the financial sector, including banking, 
securities, insurance and pension.  Figure 9 shows that the four industries are the ‘bits’ 
that interlock and interact with each other in Hong Kong financial sector.  The integration 
of the whole sector would maintain the overall stability of financial system in Hong Kong, 
which is the ‘whole’ of the local financial stability.   
 
Figure 9: Financial Stability: Local Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Taking a holistic view on the global prospective as shown in Figure 10, the whole of 
Hong Kong financial sector becomes a ‘bit’ of the global financial system.  The stability 
    
  
Pension Securities 
Insurance 
Banking 
Financial  
System 
Hong Kong 
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of local financial system links closely with the regional financial stability, like 
Guangdong, Shenzhen, Macau and Taiwan.     
 
Figure 10: Financial Stability: Global Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
To a larger extent, the stability at both local and regional stability levels are also 
important for maintaining the stability of the ‘whole’ of the global financial system, 
where the three hierarchical financial systems are interlocked and their stability also 
interact with each other. 
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